

MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS

July 1956

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General Discussion

The Central Committee Resolution dated 30 June and released on 2 July purports to be a Marxist explanation of how a Stalin could emerge from the Soviet system and why the current leaders did not remove him. In fact, the Resolution appears designed to keep critical discussion regarding Stalin under strict control both at home and abroad and to prevent such discussion from becoming an inquiry into characteristics of the Soviet system and the past actions of Soviet rulers.

Because of Moscow's sensitivity on these points, it produced a document which is distinguished for its defensive tone, lack of frankness, distortions, and contradictions. It is clear that the release on 4 June of Khrushchev's secret speech has set in motion a chain reaction of questioning and uncertainty in Western Communist Parties to which the 30 June Resolution is a response. In spite of the attempt to attribute the confusion in Communist ranks to "imperialist machinations," it is clear that doubt has been cast upon two basic elements of the relations between foreign Communist Parties and Moscow:

a. Kremlin Infallibility

The former god is cut down to size and is replaced by men of human stature. The foreign Communists have derived much strength from the infallibility myth. The way is now open for continual doubt.

b. Kremlin Credibility

Along with the end of the myth of infallibility, the Stalin denigration means that no Communist can ever again be sure that what he is told is the truth. The emphasis in the Resolution on how the "imperialists" seek to exploit the current situation cannot obscure the fact that the things the "imperialists" have been saying for years about the Soviet Union have turned out to be true. The words of those deemed to be enemies of the Soviet Union can never be rejected out of hand as before.

The basically unchanged and unchangeable nature of the dictatorial system which produced Stalin and developed under his evil genius has been once more underlined by Khrushchev at the reception for the East German leaders 16 July. Speaking "sharply," as he said, Khrushchev launched into an unexpected, bitter attack upon the West and its institutions. Western democracy, he charged, is a sham. The "monopolies" control the only effective press, and use this to "exploit the people." "They shear them like sheep." The "imperialists" who "like to speak of their election laws," have shown their disregard for free elections in the cases of Guatemala and Vietnam. The "free world" means "freedom for the capitalists to plunder the worker without interference from anyone." The discipline of the international Communist movement would guarantee its existence against the efforts of the enemy to "provoke" disunity in the wake of the de-Stalinization campaign.

Those non-Soviet Communists who may have thought that the ideals of Western democracy could somehow be made to fit into the Soviet Communist mold stand rudely corrected. The Stalinist formulas still stand.

By pledging to "help our brothers in class struggle" Khrushchev showed that Moscow would continue to dictate to the foreign CPs, and also that the line on Soviet "non-interference" in other countries is strictly sham.

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Introduction *

In order to facilitate and assist the prompt and effective exploitation of the 30 June Resolution of the CPSU and many other important statements, discussions and questions which have resulted from the de-Stalinization campaign launched by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the 20th Congress of the Party in February 1956, the attached material has been prepared.

It organizes an extensive selection of arguments, together with essential supporting evidence drawn almost entirely from Soviet sources, under a series of eight topics for ready reference.

The first seven of these topics represent in general the range of points on which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has demonstrated greatest sensitivity. The major Communist Parties of the Free World have also demonstrated their particular interest in, or concern over, each of these same points. The seven main topics are:

- I. The Soviet System as the Source of Stalinism
- II. Stalin's Rule as a Source of Degeneration of the Soviet System
- III. Refusal of the Current Leadership to Modify the Stalinist Concept of Soviet Democracy
- IV. The Question of Co-Responsibility for Stalin's Tyranny
- V. The Question of Credit for Soviet Achievements
- VI. "Guarantees" Against Recurrence of Stalinism
- VII. Moscow Control of Foreign CPs Reasserted

* Only this introduction is classified. The paper itself is unclassified.

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The eighth topic--"Omissions"--notes those points where Soviet Communist statements open up possibilities for discussion inasmuch as, for one reason or another, the Soviet leaders have not seen fit to deal with events of major interest to one or more nations throughout the world.

An Appendix is included, entitled "Criticisms and Questions Raised by Foreign Communists in the Course of the De-Stalinization Campaign." The Appendix is organized in sections generally corresponding to the sections in the body of the material, to permit easy correlation of Western Communist comments and questions with the relevant Soviet treatment of the same topic.

The material is only intended to serve on a selective basis as raw material upon which finished output can be based. Under each topic a general discussion sets forth the major issues involved and presents some background information. There then follows a listing of the relevant arguments, with supporting evidence. The use of either declarative, critical, or argumentative language and style in this text is not intended to imply that the treatment must take the same vein, nor is it intended to hamper or restrict the type of treatment to be used in output. It is designed to bring into the sharpest focus the substance of the argument, as an aid to those responsible for the final work.

It may be observed that several items of evidence are repeated in a number of different contexts. Since it is not considered likely that any substantial number of points will be incorporated into a single final product, this should not prove an obstacle to the use of the material.

While treatment obviously will be determined by each user on the basis of existing standards and instructions, it is suggested that in material directed primarily to Communist and pro-Communist audiences, the "raising of questions" is likely to be an effective approach. It is also suggested that at this juncture the treatment of the figure of Lenin in an aggressive and critical vein in material addressed to such audiences may prove counterproductive. Conversely, any use of the evidence in Section II, paragraph 8, and Section III, paragraphs 6 and 7, showing that Stalin and the present leaders have violated Lenin's dicta should avoid creating the impression that Lenin, who was a ruthless autocrat, was actually humane or democratic.

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Appendix: Criticisms And Questions Raised By Foreign Communists On The Course Of The De-Stalinization Campaign

MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES
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I. The Soviet System as the Source of Stalinism

In an effort to suppress further discussion of charges that the Soviet system itself naturally facilitates the rise of a Stalin and provides the means of and the justification for Stalinist crimes, the Soviet leadership has flatly stated that this is not the case. The denial is entirely dogmatic, unsupported by proof, belied by history and in particular, by the evidence contained in the secret Khrushchev speech, and does not begin to answer the questions raised outside the Soviet leadership. These questions have been raised, not only by non-Communists, but by some foreign Communist leaders and rank-and-file. The current leaders have given ample evidence that practices which facilitated the rise of Stalin in the first place still prevail in the system.

1. The Central Committee Resolution of 30 June is an autocratic statement designed to suppress discussion. This practice is identical with the practice employed by Stalin. The Resolution says only that it is "absolutely wrong" to "look for the source of this cult in the nature of the Soviet social order." The Resolution then attempts to evade the question of why it is "wrong" by entering into an irrelevant discussion of the nature of "Soviet democracy."

2. Lenin himself pointed out that the system, as early as December 1922, had enabled Stalin, in his role of Secretary General of the CP, to concentrate "enormous power in his hands." Lenin warned that such power could be misused. This power and the possibility of its misuse still exists. (The Lenin "Testament" was distributed to the delegates to the 20th CPSU Congress.) Khrushchev raised this problem in his secret speech, referring to the "great harm caused by ... the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of one person ..."

3. In his secret speech, Khrushchev acknowledged that doctrine in the Soviet system was a powerful weapon in the hands of Stalin in raising himself to absolute power.

"Stalin originated the concept 'enemy of the people.' This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a

controversy be proven; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin."

"Stalin's report at the February-March Central Committee Plenum in 1937, 'Deficiencies of Party work and methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and other two-facers,' contained an attempt at theoretical justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that as we march forward toward socialism class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this."

4. The present Soviet leaders continue to manipulate doctrine, just as Stalin did:

- a. In his secret speech, Khrushchev said that Stalin invented the thesis on the intensification of the class struggle as the building of "Socialism" progresses in order to give his repressive practices a "theoretical justification." The 30 June Resolution states that this formula is "only correct for certain stages of the transition," and that, being "given prominence" in 1937, it became "the basis for the grossest violations of Socialist law and mass repressions." By virtue of its power to make doctrine, the Soviet leadership has now found it expedient to denounce a Stalin doctrine as "erroneous" for a certain period, but to condone it for other times. Stalin's thesis, the Soviet leaders say, was quite valid in the forced industrialization and collectivization period (Stalin employed it correctly, in other words, against Bukharin and others in 1928 and later), but was wrong to advance it in 1937. A doctrine which was manipulated by Stalin for his own purposes, is again being manipulated in the interests of the de-Stalinization campaign of the present leaders.
- b. The CPSU manipulates Stalin's "capitalist encirclement" theory as it suits momentary purposes. At the 20th Congress, in order to further Soviet foreign policy aims, it was said that the theory was no longer valid. In the 30 June Central Committee Resolution and subsequent statements, the Soviet leaders seize once more upon

the essence of the "capitalist encirclement," in order to blame Poznan on the West and to reaffirm the principle of "vigilance" against "imperialist" machinations.

- c. At the 20th CPSU Congress a portion of Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" was rejected out of hand as inconvenient to the current Soviet foreign policy.
- d. The 20th Congress also worked out the "different roads to Socialism" line to facilitate the united front drive. Subsequently, the CPSU has seen fit to put limits on this thesis to prevent the discussion of "independence" from getting out of hand.

5. The 30 June Resolution, in Stalinist fashion, falls back upon an authoritative interpretation of history to rationalize Stalin's rise to power, in order to evade the fact that Stalin arose from the system. In the process it falsifies history when the truth does not support the argument.

- a. "How could the personality cult of Stalin, with all its negative consequences, arise and acquire such currency under conditions of the Soviet socialist regime? When examining this question one must keep in mind both the objective and concrete conditions in which the building of socialism in the USSR took place and some subjective factors connected with the personal qualities of Stalin."
- b. The "objective factors" cited in this analysis were "the capitalist encirclement" and "the merciless struggle against the enemies of Leninism." The formula of "capitalist encirclement" involves falsification of history, even in authoritative Communist terms, at least during the critical period of 1925 to 1933, when it did not in fact exist. It is not a valid argument in any case, according to the Khrushchev speech, which points out Lenin's refusal to restrict democracy even in periods of major crisis.

"In the most difficult period for our party and our country, Lenin found it necessary regularly to convoke congresses, party conferences, and plenary sessions ... where all the most important questions were discussed." (Khrushchev, secret speech)

The "merciless struggle" against the enemies of Leninism is used by the 30 June Resolution to justify restrictions of democracy and by inference the mass repressions of Stalin. In the secret speech it is used to justify only an ideological struggle, and its use by Stalin to justify mass repression is denounced:

"Worth noting is the fact that even in the progress of the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Zinovievites and others--extreme repressive measures were not used against them." (Khrushchev secret speech)

6. The CPSU has recently reaffirmed that the principles of one-party rule and individual leadership, which made Stalin possible, continue to be fixed for the Soviet system.

"As to our country, the Communist Party was, is, and will be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the one to express the ideas and hopes of the people--their leader and organizer throughout their entire struggle for Communism."

"Lenin wrote in the very first months of the organization of the Soviet state: 'It is necessary to learn to merge together the turbulent, mass-meeting-like democratism of the working masses... with iron leadership in work, with un-demurring submission to the will of the individual--the Soviet leader--in work.'" (Pravda editorial article, 6 July)

"Combating the cult of the individual one should remember that the petty bourgeois anarchist views denying the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses are alien to Marxism-Leninism. The rich experience of socialist construction teaches us that the principles of collective leadership, broad development of socialist democracy do not at all deny the role and responsibility of the individual leader for the matter entrusted to him.

"It is also well known that the Communist Party has always upheld the principle of one-man management at industrial enterprises and of one-man leadership in military matters."

7. While disposing of the particular cult of Stalin, the Soviet leadership has further revealed that it is wedded to the leader cult in practice. Throughout Khrushchev's secret speech, the 28 March Pravda editorial, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, and subsequent statements, Lenin is quoted as the ultimate authority for all questions. Khrushchev, in his secret speech, called for the establishment of "Lenin prizes" and construction of "a Palace of Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich..." The cult of Lenin resumes more fully than ever:

Lenin

"The great Lenin, genial teacher and leader of the working class and all toilers, founder of the Communist Party, is the inspirer and organizer of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Creatively developing the Marxist teaching, training the Party and preparing it for leadership of the masses in the Socialist Revolution and the building of Socialism, Lenin..."

Stalin

"The entire work of transforming our country took place under the direct leadership of Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin kept perfecting the Soviet science of planning ... developed and raised the Marxist-Leninist theory to an unrivalled height ... Comrade Stalin is the mighty continuer of Lenin's cause..." (Mikoyan on Stalin's 70th birthday, Pravda, 21 December 1949)

8. The Soviet leaders continue toward the Soviet people the practices of concealment, evasion, and manipulation of the truth which contributed to the rise of Stalin and rationalized his crimes. The ability and the readiness of the regime to do this shows that it is inherent in the Soviet system.

a. Concealment of Stalin's Crimes

Khrushchev secret speech: "We cannot let this matter get out of the Party, especially not to the press."

30 June CC Resolution: "... the CPSU ... told the whole truth, no matter how bitter."

The facts are that the Khrushchev speech has not been published in the USSR. Stalin's personal responsibility for the use of torture, fabrication of cases, mass repressions, mass deportations of nationalities; involvement in Kirov's murder, the Leningrad case, the Doctors' Plot; mistreatment of Khrushchev, Bulganin, Andreyev, Molotov, etc.; his "plans to finish off the old

members of the Political Bureau"; his personal responsibility for dismissing warnings of Hitler's attack and for the failure of Soviet military operations in the early stages of the war; his despair in the early war period--all the details of the Khrushchev speech have not been published for the Soviet people. The 30 June Resolution and subsequent statements have suppressed, minimized or glossed over the charges against Stalin made in Khrushchev's secret speech.

b. Tampering with the "Bad" Period of Stalin's Rule

Khrushchev secret speech: "Stalin's wilfulness ... became fully evident after the Seventeenth Party Congress which took place in 1934." By implication, the bad period even antedates the Seventeenth Congress: "... Mass repressions against activists increased more and more after the Seventeenth Party Congress."

30 June CC Resolution: The period 1934-1937, during which great purges occurred, is glossed over; Stalin's thesis on intensification of the class struggle, which was "given prominence in 1937 ... was the basis for the grossest violations of Socialist law and mass repressions." Emphasis is shifted away from these earlier purges to the period "when 1938 the criminal band of the agent of international imperialism, Beria, was put at the head of the state security organs."

c. The Lie that the People or Even the Party as a Whole Rule in the USSR

30 June CC Resolution: "... For nearly 40 years the authority has been in the hands of the working class and peasantry."

Khrushchev secret speech: "Stalin headed the Party and the country for thirty years ... Stalin decided everything ... No one could say anything that was contrary to his opinion ... Stalin separated himself from the people and never went anywhere ... Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in great wilfulness and choked a person morally and physically. A situation was created where one could not express one's own will."

d. Attempt to Shift the Blame onto the West

30 June CC Resolution: "For over a quarter of a century, the Soviet country was ... a besieged fortress situated in a capitalist encirclement ... Enemies sent into the USSR a large number of spies and diversionists... The threat of a new imperialist aggression against the USSR became particularly intense after the advent to power of Fascism in Germany in 1933... In the course of a fierce struggle against the whole world of imperialism our country had to submit to certain restrictions of democracy..."

Khrushchev secret speech: Ignores the "capitalist encirclement" bogeyman in describing the conditions under which Stalin exercised his tyranny and seeks to justify Stalin's misrule as in the interests of the Soviet people. Khrushchev makes a point of the fact that "Stalin ... used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened [etc.]."

Since these two positions contradict each other, it is evident that the position of the Resolution is an attempt to divert attention from internal tensions to an external enemy.

e. Attempt to Shift the Blame onto the Soviet People

Khrushchev secret speech: Makes it clear that Stalin ruled by terror exercised through his control of the secret police. Stalin "was the chief prosecutor" in the purges. "Stalin not only agreed to, but on his own initiative, issued arrest orders." Stalin issued the order for the use of torture, etc.

30 June CC Resolution: "Any action against him ... would not have been understood by the people ... would not have received support from the people." "The people consciously assumed ... certain restrictions of democracy, justified by the logic of the struggle of our people for socialism under circumstances of capitalist encirclement."

f. Deception Concerning Foreign CP Criticisms

The 30 June CC Resolution, while acknowledging that "certain of our friends abroad are not quite clear on the question of the personality cult and its

consequences," attempts to shift the blame for "confusions" onto the "tricks and devices" of "imperialist quarters" and ignores the fact that many CPs have been thrown into turmoil by the revelations of the Khrushchev speech itself. The Resolution and later materials deceive the Soviet people about the turmoil produced by the Khrushchev speech, and suppress the foreign CP criticisms by selectively quoting from foreign CP statements to show their approval.

The Togliatti Nuovi Argomenti interview with its searching analysis has not been published in the USSR. Only a single suggestion--that the Soviet system might have "degenerated" under Stalin--has been cited by the Resolution, in order to be rejected cavalierly. The much more moderate article by Eugene Dennis was published instead, but with the deletion of the references to anti-Semitism under Stalin.

The Soviet leadership has followed the same practice of selectivity since the publication of the 30 June Resolution in an attempt to deceive the Soviet people into thinking that the Resolution has met with unqualified endorsement by the foreign CPs:

"The majority of representatives of the broad public in various countries," notes the French paper L'Humanite, "look upon the decision on the personality cult and its consequences as 'one of the fundamental documents in the history of the international workers' movement...'"

"The Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party has declared that under the influence of the historic decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress inner party democracy has become stabilized in Hungary; the democracy of state and public life has strengthened, and socialist law has become firmer."

"In Italy, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party says that executive bodies of the Italian Communist Party unconditionally approve the actions which have and are being taken by the leaders of the CPSU for the complete overcoming of the personality cult of Stalin, both in the Soviet Union and in the International Workers' Movement."

"The General Secretary of the National Committee of the United States Communist Party, E. Dennis, states: 'The decision provides a correct assessment of the malicious aims of those reactionary circles which would have liked to bury the colossal achievements of the 20th CPSU Congress under a mountain of suppositions concerning the revaluation of Stalin. The assessment of him is in accord with our views. It is that reactionary circles in the United States and other countries are seeking to distort Khrushchev's special report on Stalin in order to destroy solidarity of the International Working Class Movement.'" (TASS despatch to Soviet provincial press, 10 July)

Concerning the questions of foreign Communists which are not being satisfactorily answered by the Soviet leaders, and the criticisms from abroad which the leaders are concealing from the Soviet people, see Appendix.

II. Stalin's Rule as a Source of Degeneration of the Soviet System

While not denying that Stalin's actions were harmful to the Party and the USSR, the CPSU has minimized the harmful effects of his acts and denied, without bothering to support the denial in serious terms, that the nature of the Soviet Communist system was perverted by Stalin. From the Free World point of view, this question may seem of dubious importance, since it is impossible to separate Stalin from the system which gave him power and which in turn reflects his handiwork. It is also questionable whether the "perversion" of a fundamentally bad system is in fact possible. The question is, however, of critical concern to those who are firmly identified with or dedicated to the system. In the Khrushchev speech, the damage done by Stalin to both Party and state was extensively described in very specific terms, and was shown to have seriously affected the essentials of the system. This could and did lead naturally to observations and questions by foreign (i.e., non-Soviet) Communists concerning the possibility of some degeneration or distortion having occurred in the system. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution, in denying the charges and in cutting off further Communist discussion of the question, uses a limited and unrealistic definition of what constitutes the essence of the Socialist order, and a dogmatic "Stalinist" statement that such thinking is un-Marxist, contrary to truth, and heretically "idealistic." Thus it evades the major issue of the de-Stalinization process. The Resolution's denial is belied by Lenin's warning that Stalin could distort the system, a point which Khrushchev himself raised in his secret speech:

"Fearing for the future fate of the Party and the Soviet nation, V. I. Lenin made a completely correct characterization of Stalin..."

I. The effects of Stalin's actions on both the party and state were so fundamental and serious that they undoubtedly have modified the system.

- a. "The principle of collective leadership is elementary for the proletarian party, for the Lenin-type party ... in the course of about 20 years, we in fact had no collective leadership."
(Mikoyan, 20th CPSU Congress)
- b. "Isolation of the Soviet public and state organizations from the outer world" was acknowledged by Mikoyan as having been an error in Soviet policy, and he refers to "fear of all

that can happen from contact between Soviet people and foreigners," as an alleged source of this error. Khrushchev states in his speech that "Stalin demonstrated his suspiciousness not only in relation to individuals--but in relation to whole parties and nations." Twenty years of such isolation must have had a serious effect upon the system, as the inability and unwillingness of the present leaders to consider and understand the criticisms of foreign CP leaders show.*

- c. "During the past 15 or 20 years there has been very little drawing upon the treasury of Lenin's ideas for the understanding and explaining of events." (Mikoyan, 20th CPSU Congress)

Since the scientific analysis of events is an indispensable aspect of the Soviet system, the non-Leninist interpretation of events for 20 years is bound to have had a serious effect upon the system, particularly since a whole generation of leaders has developed during this period.

- d. "The cult brought about ... sterile administration, deviations of all sorts, covering up of shortcomings and varnishing of reality. Our nation gave birth to flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit." (Khrushchev secret speech)

If Stalin's actions produced and gave authority to liars, deceivers, and sterile administrators, the actions of such individuals must in turn have had a serious effect upon the system, in which they occupied so many positions. Note the references in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution to "the mistakes in leadership in critical segments of the Soviet system which were countenanced by Stalin." The secret Khrushchev speech is more precise, and states that these characteristics were the products of Stalin's actions:

"Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged ... arbitrariness in others... We should not forget that due to the numerous arrests ... many workers began to work uncertainly, showed overcautiousness, feared all that was new, feared their own shadows.... This all produced the danger of bureaucratizing the whole apparatus."

* See 30 June Resolution comment: "Certain of our friends abroad have ... tolerated a wrong interpretation of certain of its the cult's aspects."

If the "whole apparatus" was bureaucratized, how can it be said that the system was not affected?

2. The Central Committee Resolution, in denying that Stalin's rule perverted the system, charges that those who believe that Stalin could have changed the socio-political order "enter into profound contradiction with the facts, with Marxism ... and give way to idealism."

In the light of the Resolution, should Khrushchev's secret speech and Mikoyan's speech, which clearly show the all-pervasive influence and limitless power of Stalin, now be condemned as un-Marxist and "idealistic"? It was primarily on the basis of the evidence and arguments in these two speeches, after all, that Communist Party leaders abroad raised the question of Stalin's effect upon the system. Are they also now to be condemned because they took these speeches seriously?

3. By emphasizing its "collectivity" the current leadership is evading the issue of continued concentration of unlimited power at the top. The small collective inherited all of Stalin's powers and is capable of abusing these powers just as despotically as Stalin. No meaningful changes have occurred.

- a. The Khrushchev speech states that Stalin abused the power given him and thereby increased his power to a point where he was an absolute ruler:

"Later, Stalin abusing his power more and more, began to fight eminent party and government leaders and to use terroristic methods against honest Soviet people. Attempts to oppose ... resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. In such a situation, there is no need for any sanction, for what sort of sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything?" (Khrushchev secret speech)

- b. It further stated that this absolute power made action against him impossible.

"Possessing unlimited power he Stalin indulged in great wilfulness. A situation was created in which one could not express his own will."
(Khrushchev secret speech)

- c. In Pravda of 6 July, the Communist Party's continued possession of unlimited power is reaffirmed:

"As to our country the Communist Party was, is, and will be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the one to express the ideas and hopes of the people."

- d. And power in the Party remains concentrated in the hands of the collective leadership.

"Our Communist Party is the governing Party... The Central Committee ... is a collective leader of our Party... The Presidium of the Central Committee ... is a regularly acting collective body dealing with all the most important questions of the life of the Party and country." (Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee to the 20th CPSU Congress)

- e. But there is even doubt that the "collective" Presidium decides matters. The introduction of the idea of the "Leninist core" suggests an even greater concentration of power:

"The Leninist core of the Central Committee immediately after the death of Stalin set a course of resolute struggle..." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

4. The Khrushchev speech condemns the mass repressions of the Trotskyites and other oppositionists as unnecessary violence and abandonment of Lenin's principle of ideological struggle. The Central Committee Resolution, however, by restricting its criticism of mass repression to the period after 1937, tacitly endorses the earlier repressive acts and implicitly, therefore, the degeneration of the system under Stalin.

"Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases ... Stalin on the other hand used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the Revolution was already victorious, the Soviet state strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated ..."

5. The Khrushchev speech shows that what the 30 June Resolution later referred to as the "training of the whole people in a spirit of constant vigilance and readiness in the face of foreign enemies" actually led to the weakening of the Soviet Army at a critical time, and that mass repressions created mass suspiciousness and mistrust. Such training is still a characteristic of the system and both a source and a symptom of its degeneration.

- a. "For several years officers of all ranks, soldiers in the party and Komsomol cells were taught to 'unmask' their superiors as hidden enemies. It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military

discipline in the first war period." (Khrushchev secret speech)

- b. "Mass repressions ... created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion and sowed distrust among Communists." (Khrushchev secret speech)
- c. "The capitalist encirclement has sent into our country no few spies and saboteurs.... We must therefore in every way arouse among the Soviet people the revolutionary vigilance and strengthen the state security organs." (Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee to the 20th CPSU Congress)

Here Khrushchev shows that he is the direct heir of Stalin, who set forth this task to the 18th CPSU Congress in 1939: "Never to forget that we are surrounded by a capitalist world; to remember that the foreign espionage services will smuggle spies, murderers and wreckers into our country; and, remembering this, to strengthen our Socialist intelligence service and systematically help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people."

- d. "One must not show a careless attitude toward the new machinations of the imperialist agents, who are trying to penetrate into Socialist countries for the purpose of undermining the achievements of the workers." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

6. It is contradictory to give the system credit for major successes and at the same time deny its responsibility for failures and evils of an equally serious nature.

The Resolution states that counteraction against Stalin was taken during the war years by members of the Central Committee of the Party and outstanding Soviet war commanders, but ignores the major charge in the Khrushchev speech that the most serious injustices against the national minorities in the USSR took place during this same period. The most glaring illustrations of inconsistency follow:

- a. "There were definite periods, for instance during the war years, when the individual acts of Stalin were sharply restricted and the negative consequences of lawlessness and arbitrariness were substantially diminished." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

- b. "At the end of 1943 ... a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on which they lived. The same lot befell the whole population of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic /also Chechen, Ingush, Balkars/. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them." (Khrushchev secret speech)

7. From a Marxist point of view, the 30 June Resolution is unscientific. Marxism contends that the political order of a country reflects and interacts with the economic system at the base, and more generally that individuals are the products of their environment. The Resolution simply says that the nature of a regime is determined by who owns the means of production and what class holds political authority. Since allegedly this has not changed since 1917, the Soviet system has not changed. The Resolution thus ignores the question of relation between economic and political institutions and says in effect that it doesn't really matter what happened since the Revolution. Further, if the system has not changed since 1917, it cannot prevent the rise of another Stalin, and also, the system itself must have generated its own degeneration. As Khrushchev put it,

"... the cult of the person of Stalin ... became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality." (Khrushchev secret speech. Emphasis supplied.)

8. Whereas the 30 June Central Committee Resolution stated that one-man rule could not possibly "change the nature of the Socialist state," it is a fact that Lenin prescribed some changes for the Soviet system, and that in neglecting to carry them out, Stalin changed the system, even as Lenin had envisaged it. Lenin specifically advocated that the central government

"... retain the union of the Socialist Soviet republics only in the sphere of military affairs and diplomacy, while in other matters each of the people's commissariats will be fully independent." (Lenin, "Concerning the National Question or 'Autonomization'")

This decentralization of key elements of power has never been carried out.

III. Refusal of the Current Leadership to Modify the Stalinist Concept of Soviet Democracy

The CPSU appears to have been alarmed and embarrassed by evidence that the discussions of the cult of the individual reflected the Soviet people's hope for a relaxation and democratization of the Soviet state. At the same time, in many Communist Parties, there was evidence of a critical scrutinizing and questioning of the true workings of inner-party democracy in the light of the revelations concerning the operations of the CPSU under Stalin. Failing to understand or refusing to consider significant changes seriously, the CPSU has clearly indicated that the deceptive and peculiar Stalinist concept of Soviet democracy remains essentially unchanged.

The 30 June Central Committee Resolution depicts popular support of Stalin as a factor impeding the taking of action against him. The Khrushchev secret speech, on the other hand, paints a picture of the complete helplessness and subjugation of the entire nation--both people and Party--under Stalin's rule, and of personal pride and wilfulness as major motives of Stalin's actions. Examined against these two situations, the position of the Soviet people in the state is either that of slaves or helpless children to be led by the Party.

1. In an attempt to suppress foreign Communist and non-Communist discussion of the nature of Soviet "democracy" in Western terms, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution reverts to Stalinist definitions. Accordingly, Soviet "democracy" is reduced to such questions as the popularity of the regime, success of the Soviet state, civil liberties determined by those in power at their own discretion, and material benefits.

The system of Soviets is described as a system of "genuine popular authority":

"The essence of democracy is not in formal indications, but in whether political authority serves and reflects in action the will and interests of the majority of the people, the interests of the workers. The entire internal and foreign policy of the Soviet state proclaims the fact that our regime is truly democratic, a truly popular regime. The highest aim of the Soviet state's daily concern is the raising in every respect of the people's living standards, the securing of a peaceful existence for its people." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

2. The Khrushchev secret speech denies the possibility that the Soviet system under Stalin's absolute rule could reflect the desires and best interests of the people, since Stalin isolated himself from the people and was not aware of the real state of affairs.

"Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities and the fact that he was not aware of the real state of affairs in the provinces can be illustrated..."

"Stalin never traveled anywhere, did not meet city and collective workers..."

"Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situation at the front. This was natural because during the whole patriotic war he never visited any section of the front..."

And "Stalin decided everything." (Khrushchev secret speech)

3. The Soviet leadership has recently reaffirmed that the Soviet people are irrevocably subordinated to authoritarian one-party dictatorship, "iron discipline," individual leadership, and unrelenting control of the press. Alternative voices are still denied them, in spite of the now proven fact that the Party could not protect the people, the Soviet state, or itself against a Stalin.

"As to our country, the Communist Party was, is, and will be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the one to express the ideas and hopes of the people--their leader and organizer throughout their entire struggle for Communism."

"A new homogeneous society has been created in the Soviet Union. It is void of any hostile classes, of any social groups whose interests fail to coincide. Therefore, there is no social ground in the Soviet society for the origination and existence of other than the Communist Party." (Pravda, editorial article, 6 July)

4. Even the necessity of "undemurring submission to the will of the individual" is being propagated currently. (Pravda, quoting Lenin, 8 July)

"The rich experience of socialist construction teaches us that the principles of collective leadership ... do not at all deny the role of the individual leader for the matter entrusted to him."

5. Lenin is cited as the authority against freedom of the press: "'Freedom of the press ... in a world in which there exist capitalists, is freedom to buy the press, to buy those who write in it, to bribe and to fabricate public opinion in favor of the bourgeoisie' In our Soviet country there is and there can be no freedom to buy or to bribe the press." (Pravda editorial article, 8 July) The argument that freedom would make it possible for hostile class interests to make use of a Soviet publication is contradictory to the argument employed to explain why there is no need for more than one party in the USSR:

"At the present time, as a result of the victory of Socialism, a new homogeneous society has been created in the Soviet Union. It is void of any hostile classes, of any hostile groups whose interests fail to coincide. There is no social ground in the Soviet society for the origination and existence of other than the Communist Party." (Pravda editorial article, 6 July. Emphasis supplied.)

6. While the present leadership cites Lenin as authority for its restriction of democratic freedoms, the current definition of Soviet democracy fails to meet even Lenin's definition of democracy in at least one major respect. Even the Communist Party itself fails to meet this test.

"Everyone will probably agree that 'broad democratic principles' presupposes two following conditions: first, full publicity, and second, election to all functions. It would be absurd to speak of democracy without publicity; that is, publicity which extends beyond the circle of membership of the organization.... No one would ever call an organization that is hidden from everyone but its members by a veil of secrecy, a democratic organization." (Lenin, "What is to be Done?")

"We cannot let this matter get beyond the party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason we are considering it here at a closed Congress session." (Khrushchev secret speech)

7. The Soviet leaders today also continue to violate Lenin's dictum that even in the peculiarly Soviet type of "democracy" the people "must have the right to know and check even the smallest step in ... the work ... of their responsible leaders."

a. This statement was quoted in the Pravda editorial article of 28 March, "Why is the cult

Duplicate
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of the individual alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism?"

- b. The Khrushchev speech of 25 February, being secret and enjoining secrecy, violates this principle, as do many other events. (For example, the facts and pleadings of the cases of Beria, Bagirov, et al., have never been published.)
- c. The statement in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution that opposition to Stalin would "not have been understood by the people" shows that the regime has never considered it necessary to let the people know the truth. The Soviet people are considered incapable of comprehending the truth (since their ideas are the creations of official propaganda) and are only told those things that suit the particular needs of those in power (Stalin or the "collective").

8. The thesis concerning Stalin's popularity, as stated in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, shows that the current Soviet leadership believes the people to have been either fools or dupes: fools, if in the light of what was happening in the Soviet Union, they still loved Stalin; dupes, if what was happening was kept from them by a controlled propaganda machine.

IV. The Question of Co-Responsibility for Stalin's Tyranny

In the course of the de-Stalinization campaign the CPSU leadership--or at least a major element of it--has sought to avoid discussion of the question of its co-responsibility for Stalin's errors and crimes. The secret speech, however, intentionally or unintentionally, raised this question when it clearly implicated many of the leaders in the authentication and execution of Stalin's policies, showed that they knew about his illegal methods of action, and described how they sympathized with some who did oppose Stalin. The secret speech also shows that in many instances Stalin had the active support of the leaders, and that even as late as the World War II period, they urged him to resume active leadership after he had largely withdrawn as a consequence of the initial Soviet defeats. In an effort to conceal their culpability, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution and later material refrain generally from mentioning these facts. They seek to shift responsibility to the Soviet people, and "objective" circumstances, and also to shut off foreign Communist discussion of the issue.

1. Khrushchev, in seeking to explain why the members of the Politburo did "not assert themselves" against Stalin, admits co-responsibility: "The members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times."

- a. "Initially, many of them backed Stalin because he was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and party work." (Khrushchev secret speech)
- b. This was in spite of the fact that Lenin had warned the Party against Stalin and urged his removal from the post of Secretary General. (Lenin's "Testament") In other words, the Party leaders disregarded Lenin's advice and put themselves into Stalin's hands, "hoping that he would heed the critical remarks of Vladimir Ilyich and would be able to overcome the defects which caused Lenin serious anxiety." (Khrushchev secret speech)

2. By 1934, according to Khrushchev, Stalin "had so elevated himself above the Party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the Party." The CPSU has completely failed to explain how this arrogation of one-man power by Stalin occurred, at the time when the Party was still capable of restricting his powers.

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3. Thereafter, Stalin made use of police power to terrorize the Party and the people.

"Stalin acted ... by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his position, was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation." (Khrushchev secret speech)

4. It is evident that the other leaders, in order to remain in power, submitted to Stalin's will and in this respect, bear responsibility with him for the crimes. The statement in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution--that it was not "a question of personal courage"--is amply demonstrated in the Khrushchev speech to have been false. The other leaders, in order to gain and protect their positions, became the "many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit," which Khrushchev said had been produced under Stalin.

5. The Soviet statements have neglected to account for the fact that Stalin's thesis on the intensification of the class struggle--which both Khrushchev and the 30 June Central Committee Resolution said was a major weapon in Stalin's terror policy--was accepted by the Central Committee in 1937 despite Khrushchev's claim that many opposed it.

6. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution produces, for the first time, an allegation that there was "counter-action against the negative manifestations which were connected with the personality cult..." The "counter-action" was credited to a "Leninist core of leaders." The Resolution states that "there were certain periods, for instance during the war years, when the individual acts of Stalin were sharply restricted."

- a. There is no explanation of why the "core" was able to act at "certain" times, but not at others; nor of how it was able to survive against the certain "vengeance" which Khrushchev said awaited anyone who opposed Stalin.
- b. It is not explained why the "core" failed to act at what would appear, from Khrushchev's secret speech, to have been a golden opportunity to take power away from Stalin, namely, when the Central Committee Plenum was called in October 1941. Stalin refused to meet with the Central Committee members, but if the "core" had been resolute, the Plenum could have been convened without Stalin.

- c. The existence of a "Leninist core" brings into question the role of those "members of the Political Bureau" who recalled Stalin to active leadership from the state of inactivity into which Khrushchev stated he had withdrawn. Were they members of the "core"? If so, what has the "core" done to punish them for bringing Stalin back?

7. Khrushchev has claimed that the other leaders were ignorant of many of the facts of Stalin's crimes until after the removal of Beria. Even if the impossibility of the other leaders having worn blinders throughout the entire Stalin period is not taken into account, the claim is not valid.

- a. In his speech, Khrushchev admits that he, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich knew in 1931 that Beria's reputation was bad (i.e., long before Beria got power).
- b. The leaders knew that many top functionaries were being purged; they also knew what measures the Party statutes prescribed and that these statutes were being violated.
- c. Khrushchev, along with many others, knew of Stalin's coded telegram of 20 January 1939 (to Secretaries of Oblast and Krai Committees, etc.) endorsing the use of torture.
- d. Ignatiev must have had access to MVD records in 1952, before Beria's ouster. (Ignatiev, incidentally, attended the 20th Congress and is now Party Secretary in Bashkir.)
- e. The "Committee of Information," established in 1947 under the Council of Ministers, had access to all data on the activities of the Soviet intelligence organs, which Stalin personally exploited to liquidate his opponents. Molotov was chairman of the committee in the beginning. The committee existed until 1951. V. A. Zorin, Andrei Vyshinsky, and Yakub Malik were also concerned with the committee.

8. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution states that "immediately after the death of Stalin, the Leninist core of the Central Committee set a course of resolute struggle against the personality cult and its grave consequences."

- a. Khrushchev was hailing Stalin as "the great continuer of Lenin's cause" in April 1954. (Speech to the Supreme Soviet)

- b. Even as late as December 1955, Stalin's birthday was the occasion for adulatory statements about his merits.

9. The co-responsibility of the entire CPSU leadership during the period of Stalin's rule is clear in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, which states:

"All these difficulties on the path of building socialism were overcome by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee which consistently carried out Lenin's general line."

If the Central Committee chooses to claim credit for the achievements of the USSR, it stamps Khrushchev's statements that Stalin ruled alone as a lie. Similarly, if "Lenin's general line" was being carried out, how account for the Stalinist evil? Was that a result of "Lenin's general line"?

V. The Question of Credit for Soviet Achievements

The current regime, while placing the blame upon Stalin for excesses and evils, denies that he is entitled to exclusive credit for the major successes of the Soviet state during the past 40 years. As a consequence, the question of who deserves the credit arises.

While the Khrushchev secret speech was in general non-partisan in giving credit for successes to the Party, the government, technical and intellectual leading workers, and the Soviet people, it was quite explicit in giving credit for the successful prosecution of the war to the generals, and in the same context carried implied criticism of the actions of the Party in connection with preparedness and the efficiency of the Armed Forces just prior to World War II. Later material, particularly the Pravda editorial of 6 July, is less balanced, and claims the greatest share of credit for the Party for all the socialist successes. In the 30 June Central Committee Resolution a so-called "Leninist core" of the leadership lays claim to major credit for itself.

Although, according to the secret speech, the restoration of the Party to its rightful role was an avowed aim of the de-Stalinization campaign, the speech's revelations of the extent to which the Party had been ignored and deprived of power under Stalin evoked from Communists everywhere embarrassing questions of what essential role the Party played in the Soviet system. This appears to have inspired the observed shift in treatment of the Party's claim to credit for the past successes of the Soviet state.

1. The Khrushchev speech gives major credit for the successful conduct of the war to the Soviet generals.

"We paid with great losses until our generals, upon whose shoulders rested the whole weight of conducting the war, succeeded in changing the situation and shifting to flexible maneuver operations, which immediately brought serious changes at the Front favorable to us." (Khrushchev secret speech)

"And where are the military on whose shoulders rested the burden of the war? ... With Stalin in, no room was left for them." (Khrushchev secret speech)

2. The Khrushchev speech criticizes the role of the Party in connection with the Soviet Army's preparedness for war.

"For several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in the Party and Komsomol cells were taught to 'unmask' their superiors as hidden enemies. It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the first war period." (Khrushchev secret speech)

"Before the war ... all our political-educational work was characterized by its bragging tone; when the enemy violates the holy Soviet soil ... we will battle the enemy on his soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves. But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts." (Khrushchev secret speech)

3. The Resolution claims credit for the "Leninist core" of the CPSU leadership which is inconsistent with the statements in the Khrushchev speech.

- a. "During the war years, the individual acts of Stalin were sharply restricted... It is known that precisely during this period members of the Central Committee and also outstanding Soviet commanders took over certain sectors of activity ... made independent decisions, and through their organizational, political, economic, and military work ... insured the victory of the Soviet people in the war." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)
- b. "It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe disaster ... Stalin thought this was the end... After this Stalin ... ceased to do anything whatsoever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary to take certain steps immediately to improve the situation at the Front." (Khrushchev secret speech)

4. The CPSU claims that credit for all the successes of the Soviet state belongs to the Communist Party.

"Our socialist state owes all its successes to the leadership of the Communist Party." (Pravda, 6 July)

5. The Party seeks to assume credit for all the actions of its members in the Soviet government and the Soviet economy.

"Whenever the country was in danger ... the Communists were the first to rush ahead... During the years of the Great Fatherland War ... the Party directed its best forces to the military fronts and to decisive sectors in the rear."

"Our Party is boldly leading us along this path strengthening Soviet state, upsurge of agriculture, etc., for it unites in its ranks the most progressive, the most conscious ... section of the Soviet people."

"By its tremendous efforts ... the Party has accumulated a rich experience of leadership in all spheres of the state--economic and cultural construction... Nearly four decades have passed ... and each day ... was filled with the tireless activity of the Party in directing the country, in the socialist transformation of its economy and culture, in defense of what has been achieved ... and in strengthening and development of the principles of the international solidarity of the workers." (Pravda, 6 July)

6. The falseness of the last quotation given above from Pravda, 6 July, can be abundantly demonstrated by comparison with the many statements given elsewhere* concerning the Party's lack of initiative and authority and the helplessness of the Party leadership during Stalin's years.

7. Although the CPSU claims that its great strength is shown by its campaign against the cult--

"The fact that we present in all its ramifications the basic problem of overcoming the cult--is an evidence of the great moral and political strength of our Party." (Khrushchev secret speech)

"The fact that the Party itself openly and boldly posed the question of liquidating the personality cult--is the best proof of the force and viability of the Soviet Socialist regime." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

--it immediately destroys the argument and shows its true weakness by admitting that action against Stalin was not possible until his death.

"The 20th Congress and the entire policy of the Central Committee after the death of Stalin bear vivid testimony..."

"Why did these people not take a stand against Stalin and remove him from leadership? This could not be done in the circumstances ... such a stand would have been considered a blow against the unity of the party and the whole state, extremely dangerous in the presence of capitalist encirclement." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

"After Stalin's death the Central Committee began ... a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is ... foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person ..."

"Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? ... Attempts to oppose resulted in the opponent falling victim to repression." (Khrushchev secret speech)

VI. "Guarantees" Against Recurrence of Stalinism

Safeguards adequate to ensure that another Stalin cannot arise do not, in spite of the CPSU Resolution, exist at present in the Soviet system.

After the Khrushchev speech called for study and analysis to determine what measures beyond those already taken would be necessary to ensure that another Stalin could not arise, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution abruptly stated that all the necessary measures have already been taken, and that adequate guarantees against a repetition of Stalin's actions now exist. A review of the measures and guarantees referred to does not demonstrate that the critical elements of the Party and state system which led to Stalin's rise* have, in fact, been brought under adequate control. In particular there is no provision for popular checks on the leadership or for freedom of expression and dissemination of information.

The fundamental dilemma over this question of guarantees in the Soviet system is shown clearly by the Khrushchev speech to lie in the possibility that deeds such as Stalin's can be committed in the belief that they are done in the interest of the Communist cause itself.

1. Restoration of collective leadership is claimed as a guarantee against the rise of another Stalin, but this statement is meaningless since there are no guarantees that collective leadership itself will continue, or that the collective itself will not become despotic.

Although Khrushchev said--"Lenin worked out the principles of party direction ... stressing that the guiding principle of party leadership is its collegiality. Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers." (Khrushchev secret speech)--there is no guarantee that a member of the collective leadership, if he so chooses cannot impose his views upon his co-workers, nor any way in which an attempt to do so could be observed by the ranks of the party and the citizens.

2. As a guarantee of collective leadership, Lenin, in his "Testament," placed his faith in the selection for the position of Secretary General, of an individual who has certain personal characteristics. But as the case of Stalin demonstrates,

* See Section I

the collective leadership cannot--even after a warning such as that given by Lenin--be trusted to select someone who will not turn into another Stalin.

"The delegates to the 13th Congress declared themselves in favor of retaining Stalin, hoping that he would heed the critical remarks of Lenin." (Khrushchev secret speech)

3. The power of the Party in the Soviet state is still unlimited. No system of checks and balances operates within the Party to restrict the unlimited use of power by the collective leadership or by any individual acting in its name, as Stalin did (e.g., division of powers, limits on terms of office, alternative candidates for leadership, to be chosen democratically).

"As to our country, the Communist Party was, is, and will be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the one to express the ideas and hopes of the people--their leader and organizer." (Pravda, 6 July)

"Lenin called the Central Committee of the Party a collective of leaders and the guardian and interpreter of party principles...Lenin pointed out: 'Our Central Committee constituted itself as a closely centralized and highly authoritative group...'" (Khrushchev secret speech)

4. Khrushchev demanded further critical study and the taking of any additional steps needed to prevent the rise of another Stalin, and defined such study as a specific task. Although this is stated as a task in the secret speech, this work does not appear among the tasks listed in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, and there is no indication such study is in progress.

"We have to consider seriously and **analyze correctly** this matter in order that we may preclude the possibility of a repetition, in any form whatever, of what took place during the life of Stalin." (Khrushchev secret speech)

5. Adherence to Socialist law is claimed as a guarantee against the rise of another Stalin, but no guarantee is given that the collective leadership or anyone acting in its name as Stalin did, must and will adhere to the law.

"In such a situation there was no need for any sanction, since what sort of sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything?" (Khrushchev secret speech)

6. The decentralization measures carried out in the Soviet state are claimed to be guarantees against the rise of another Stalin. But the amount of decentralization which has actually resulted from these measures is insignificant. In any event, the measures do not restrict centralized control of the three primary instruments of power identified by Lenin as the organs of authority and repression under the dictatorship of the proletariat--the Army, the Police and the Communist Party.

7. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution states that it was not possible for the leadership to take action against Stalin, because the people credited him with the Party's successes, and did not know of his errors. But there is no guarantee that such a situation cannot recur since the practice through which the people were misled--i.e., Party monopoly control of all information channels, and of all information concerning the activities of its leadership which reaches the people--continues to operate.

a. "It should not be forgotten that the Soviet people knew Stalin as a person who always acted in defense of the USSR, and struggled for the cause of socialism." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

b. "We cannot let this matter get out of the Party especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes." (Khrushchev secret speech)

"We do not want to commit suicide, and that is why we will not do it." (Lenin, on granting freedom of the press, quoted in Pravda, 8 July)

8. Since an authoritative interpretation of "objective conditions" by the leadership of the Communist Party is all that is required to sanction as necessary the reestablishment of Stalinist practices and restrictions, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution's statements -- "the most difficult period in the development and establishment of socialism is behind us" and "on the possibility of preventing wars during the present era"--are the sole guarantees that the Stalin experience will not be repeated. It has already been shown that errors can be

made in such statements, and that the statements can be manipulated as the requirements of the leadership dictate.

9. The fundamental fact that guarantees cannot be dependable in the Soviet system is brought sharply into focus by Khrushchev in the following statement:

"Stalin was convinced that this his now condemned actions/ was necessary for the defense of the interests of the working class. He saw this from the position of ... the interest of the victory of socialism and Communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot ... In this lies the whole tragedy!"
(Khrushchev secret speech)

VII. Moscow Control Of Foreign CPs Reasserted

Moved by CPSU pronouncements, some Communist Parties apparently miscalculated the extent to which criticism of the CPSU, the Soviet system, and the taking of independent action was permissible in the course of the de-Stalinization campaign, and have been sharply snapped back into line by the 30 June Central Committee Resolution.

Foreign Communist comment and criticism, based on the 30th Congress speeches and the Congress Resolution on the cult of the individual and on the "different roads to Socialism," initially involved penetrating questions concerning problems embarrassing to the Soviet leadership.* The release of the Khrushchev speech (passed by the CPSU itself to top satellite Party figures, given semi-official authentication by Moscow correspondents of foreign Communist Parties, and released by the State Department to the world press) provoked an intensification of such questioning, as well as criticism of the current attitudes of the CPSU toward other Communist Parties. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution, which was apparently directed primarily to the foreign Communist parties, and later CPSU statements imposed narrow limits on discussion, reprimanded Parties which had violated those limits, and reminded them of the essentially unchanged dominance of the CPSU. Criticism still emanates from Communist Parties, destroying the thesis of the 30 June Resolution that the cause of confusion and dissension in the "socialist" world is the activity of anti-Communist enemies and of the capitalist proponents of the cold war. A measure of the perplexities of the foreign Communist Parties and of their dependence upon Moscow is provided by the rash of trips by foreign Communist leaders to Moscow and the mission of Suslov and company to the 14th Congress of CP France.

1. The Soviet leaders themselves were responsible for letting foreign Communists think that they could begin to act with greater freedom from Moscow--that they could criticize and question the CPSU, and that they could begin to act with greater independence from the Moscow line.

a. The CPSU opened up the question of "national Communism" in connection with the rapprochement with Tito and the discussion of the "different roads to Socialism" which the rapprochement entailed:

* See Sections I - VI.

"...while maintaining the unity of the main and most important matters and common path, the transition to Socialism in various countries will not be quite alike and ... each nation will make its own contribution to one form of democracy or another, to one form of the dictatorship of the proletariat or another, to one phase of the Socialist transformation or another, and to the various sides of social life." (Suslov, 20th CPSU Congress)

- b. The criticisms of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress "shocked" the foreign Communists and encouraged them to join in the criticism. The de-Stalinization campaign was launched in the open speeches at the Congress, especially in Mikoyan's statements that "in the course of about 20 years, we in fact had no collective leadership" and his criticisms of Stalin's "Short History of the CPSU" and "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." These public CPSU statements provoked a mild flurry in the foreign CPs. Some of the details of the secret Khrushchev speech got into the Western Press in mid-March, and provoked a somewhat stronger reaction within some Western CPs--a reaction which measurably increased when West European Communist newsmen in Moscow reported that the secret speech in fact had been given, and told some of the details of the speech. Meanwhile, some satellite leaders (notably, Ulbricht and Rakosi) were discussing Stalin in sharp terms. All these developments, for which the CPSU itself was responsible, stimulated foreign Communists into further questioning and criticism--a process which naturally reached a climax when the secret speech itself was released to the press.

2. The CPSU has since sought to throttle the foreign Communist criticism touched off by the revelations about Stalin. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution clearly had this as its purpose.

- a. It misleadingly claims that the foreign CPs have unqualifiedly endorsed the de-Stalinization campaign: "Condemnation by our Party of the personality cult of J. V. Stalin and of its consequences, brought approval and wide response in all brotherly Communist and workers' parties."
- b. It ignores the embarrassing questions raised by the foreign Communists.

- c. It belittles the confusions by stating condescendingly "that certain of our friends abroad are not quite clear on the question of the personality cult and its consequences and sometimes give incorrect interpretations of certain points connected with the personality cult."
- d. It condemns such criticisms as "absolutely wrong." They are "not in accord with reality and contradict the facts."
- e. It shuts off debate by stating that the Stalin issue is "a case of a past stage in the life of the Soviet country."
- f. It claims that only the "enemies of Communism" are responsible for the confusion in the international Communist movement: "Launching a slanderous campaign, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie are again ... attempting to cast a shadow on the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism, undermine the trust of the working people ... to sow confusion into the ranks of the international Communist and workers' movement."
- g. It seeks to turn aside embarrassing basic questions touching upon the Soviet system by "explaining" Stalin's despotism as a result of "objective factors" (the machinations of the capitalists) and the "struggle against the enemies of Leninism."

3. More recently, the Soviet leaders have bluntly reminded the non-Soviet Communist Parties that the discussion period is ended and that they must resume their role as unquestioning agents of Moscow.

"If the workers' parties did not maintain unity of action and opinion on the most important questions, this would play into the hands of the enemies of Communism and would harm the Party and the cause of Socialism." (Moscow broadcast to Europe, 12 July)

4. The CPSU has flatly rejected the idea of "national Communism" for individual CPs:

"One should not forget that in certain places there still are opportunist elements on whom the enemies of the working people are undoubtedly banking. One should also remember that among the insufficiently

politically mature and exceedingly credulous people there might be those who would fall for the noisy words about 'national Communism' and for the contention that international connections of Communist Parties have allegedly become 'superfluous,' and so on." (Pravda editorial article, TASS, 15 July)

5. Not only has Moscow spoken against "national Communism," but it has even turned down the thesis put forward by Togliatti that non-Communist parties can build socialism.* The CP must be in charge:

"In other countries proceeding along the road to socialism, other workers' parties may be given the opportunity of taking part in the administration--on the condition that the leading role is assured for the revolutionary Marxist party, which expresses the interests of the working class in the most consistent manner i.e., the CP." (Pravda, editorial article, 6 July)

6. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution makes it clear that all the decisions are binding on the non-Soviet CPs, that the de-Stalinization campaign is designed to further the interests of international Communism and that they must buckle down to business without further dallying over the Stalin issue.

- a. The 20th Congress decisions have "opened up new prospects" for international Communism. The "important fundamental theses on peaceful coexistence" and the different "forms of transition of countries to Socialism" are "promoting" the "further consolidation of the positions of the world system of Socialism."
- b. The CPSU, the Resolution states, "believed that even if the stand taken against the cult of Stalin caused some temporary difficulties, then in the long run, from the point of view of the vital interests and ultimate aims of the working class, this would have a great positive result."
- c. The foreign Communists should realize that the Stalin era is "a past stage," that the CPSU has "been with exceptional persistence and determination liquidating the consequences of the personality cult," and they should not be taken in by

* "...There are countries where we wish to start socialism although the Communists are not the leading party." (Togliatti, "Nuovi Argomenti" Interview, L'Unita, 17 June)

the "tricks and devices" of the "ideologist of capitalism ... to distract the attention of the working people from the advanced and inspiring ideas posed before mankind by the Socialist world."

7. It is notable that the CPSU, in rudely clamping down on the foreign CPs, has shown substantially less concern for their problems and background than it has for the Yugoslav Communists. According to the declaration of the CPSU and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (released 30 June)--

"...proceeding from the fact that either side holds alien any tendency to force its views with regard to the ways and forms of socialist development, both sides have agreed that the aforesaid cooperation should be based on complete voluntariness and equality, friendly criticism, and comradely exchange of views on the contentious issues between our parties." (TASS, Moscow, 20 June)

VIII. Omissions

Both the Khrushchev secret speech and the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, in varying degrees, refer to certain fundamental areas of policy in which Stalin is said to have committed crimes or been in error. The following list notes a number of actions in each of these areas which merit consideration they were not given.

1. Mass Repressions (1934-1937)

While there is no charge in either document that the repressive activities in connection with collectivization merit condemnation, the Khrushchev speech condemns as "unnecessary" the repressive measures taken during the great purges against proven oppositionists (Trotskyites, etc.). This condemnation is omitted from the 30 June Resolution, which agrees with the Khrushchev speech only on the crimes involved in the use of mass repression against loyal Party members during the same period. Presumably as of 30 June the Central Committee had decided that the mass repression of the opposition was after all necessary, as Stalin had said.

2. Deportations

The secret speech condemns a number of cases of mass deportations which "were not justified by military necessity," but does not include those of the Baltic states, eastern Poland, or the Volga Germans. The resolution ignores this matter entirely.

3. Collectivization

Both the secret speech and the 30 June Central Committee Resolution endorse the program of forced collectivization, which entailed the greatest single case of the use of violence and mass repression in the history of the Soviet Union. Although this fact is not discussed, the treatment of the collectivization period justifies continued highlighting of the inherent inhumanity and brutality of the system.

4. Anti-Semitism

The Soviet documents steer clear of the anti-Semitic implications of the campaign against cosmopolitanism in the early postwar period and the doctor's plot just before Stalin's death. They ignore the questions of foreign Communists about the murder of Jewish cultural leaders and the destruction of Jewish cultural institutions. Soviet sensitivity on this score was indicated by the fact that Pravda's reprint of U.S. Communist leader Dennis'

article deleted a phrase about the "snuffing out ... of more than a score of Jewish cultural figures" and added a footnote on the doctor's plot which implied that not only the Jews but other nationalities were involved.

5. Foreign Policy

In the field of Soviet foreign policy, "peaceful relations with other nations were often threatened because one-man decisions could and often did cause great complications."

"The willfulness of Stalin showed itself ... in the international affairs of the Soviet Union." (Khrushchev secret speech)

However, the only matter specifically mentioned is the case of Yugoslavia. By placing the blame on Stalin the present Soviet leaders could, as they have in other matters, evade responsibility for many acts which still obstruct the lessening of international tensions. The question naturally arises whether by failing to repudiate such acts the Soviet leadership does not risk being considered as giving tacit approval to them. What were these wrong decisions? Did they include the postwar actions in occupied northern Iran, the Berlin blockade, the refusal to permit the European satellite states to participate in the Marshall plan, the Korean war, the virulent anti-American propaganda campaign of 1947-1951? Does the Yugoslav case carry with it the implication that similar wrong policies were pursued--successfully--in dealing with other European satellites? What of their actions toward the United Nations during the Korean War?

In connection with Yugoslavia it should be noted that the Soviet leaders when they visited Belgrade sought to put the blame entirely on Beria rather than Stalin.

A P P E N D I X

CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS
IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN

The material herein has been organized to correspond generally with the organization followed in the body of the paper. The preponderance of American and Italian materials is explained by the fact that Communists in these countries have raised the most penetrating questions. Extensive use has been made of quotations from Pietro Nenni, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party, which has been in close alliance with CP Italy.

APPENDIX

CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS
IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN

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CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS
IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN

General

1. The Shock of the Khrushchev Revelations About Stalin

"There is little that one can say to take the deadly edge off of the secret Khrushchev speech, and I, for one, have no desire to enter the argument as to the manner of its presentation. I am puzzled but not deeply concerned as to why Mr. Khrushchev made the report public in the fashion he did; my concern is not with the manner of the document, but with its content.

"It is a strange and awful document, perhaps without parallel in history; and one must face the fact that it itemizes the record of barbarism and paranoid bloodlust that will be a lasting and shameful memory to civilized man." (Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker, 12 June)

"We especially, because we are Communists, understand and share the profound grief and shock of the Soviet people. The crimes and brutalities that sullied the latter period of Stalin's leadership are unforgivable." (Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)

"All Communists, in common with all Democratic and progressive people, are deeply shocked by the injustices and crimes which during the period under review violated the essential principles of socialist democracy and legality and dishonored the noble cause of Communism." (Statement of the Political Committee of the British Communist Party, London Daily Worker, 22 June)

"... The text of Khrushchev's speech will both frighten and shock those who read it." (Norway, Friheten, 8 June)

2. Inadequacy of Soviet Explanation Until the Publication of the 30 June Central Committee Resolution

"The K. report lacks any kind of Marxist analysis of Soviet society and historical reconstruction of the moment in which under the influence of determinate objective or subjective relations all power was transferred into the hands of Stalin." (Pietro Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"... As long as we confine ourselves, in substance, to denouncing the personal faults of Stalin as the cause of everything we remain within the realm of the 'personality cult.' First, all that was good was attributed to the superhuman, positive qualities of one man; now all that is evil is attributed to his equally exceptional and even astonishing faults. In the one case, as well as in the other, we are outside the criterion of judgment intrinsic in Marxism." (Palmiro Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"The explanations given up to now of Stalin's errors, their origin, and the conditions under which they developed, are not satisfactory. A thorough Marxist analysis to determine all the circumstances under which Stalin was able to exercise his personal power is indispensable." (Statement of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party, L'Humanite, 19 June)

"We agree with the observations of Comrade Togliatti and the French CP that it will be necessary to make a profound Marxist analysis of the causes of the degeneration in the functioning of Soviet democracy and Party democracy; that it is not enough to attribute these developments solely to the character of one individual, and that a more adequate estimate of the role of Stalin, both in its positive and negative aspects, will be necessary." (Statement of the Political Committee of the British Communist Party, London Daily Worker, 22 June)

3. Reservations Concerning the Adequacy of the Soviet Explanation of the 30 June Resolution

"Many Marxists will feel satisfied with the answers which the Soviet Communist Party now presents. Many will feel that the final answers still need to be found and that the discussion must continue." (New York Daily Worker editorial, 3 July)

"As for my attitude at my well-known interview, perhaps the best thing to do now is to read carefully what I have written. In my opinion, and I have said so openly, the line followed by the Soviet Comrades in the construction of a Communist society was undoubtedly right; but within the general framework of this acknowledgement, there may be differing opinions on the value and importance of the errors committed under Stalin's leadership, the violations of legality, the restrictions on democracy, and so on, over the economic and political development of the Soviet Union."

"I repeat that such differing opinions are possible and a frank discussion on the matter cannot but prove useful for the development of our movement..." (Palmiro Togliatti, Paese Sera, 3 July)

"From the resolution of the Central Committee emerges the principle of the necessity of 'War Communism' which Stalin exploited for his dictatorial ends.

"But all this is still not sufficient. The phases of passing from the dictatorship of the proletariat to that of the Party, and from the latter to that of Stalin, are not described in the documents; nor is there any treatment of how and why Stalin succeeded in carrying out his plans. ...Why was Stalin able to succeed in ridding himself with relative ease of all his adversaries, in depriving the directing organs of the Party of authority, in substituting himself for justice and government from local soviets all the way up to the Supreme Soviets? Why did the Party, the Soviets, the proletariat not resist before Stalin triumphed, and why were those who did resist isolated and defeated?

"The document of the Central Committee does not answer all this; it does not explain why Stalin's power was such that he could exploit a fundamental error which prevailed in the Bolshevik Party after the death of Lenin." (Editorial, Avanti, 3 July)

I. Foreign Communist Questions and Criticisms Touching Upon the Basis of the Soviet System

1. General

"The no longer secret report of Khrushchev, which made Stalin a sort of modern Ivan the Terrible, goes beyond an attack on the man and hits the system, the ideological problems connected with the notion of dictatorship of the proletariat and its application in the USSR, hits the Leninist notion of the working party as well as the Stalinist notion, and attacks the structure of the state born of the October Revolution." (Pietro Nenni, Avanti, 17 June)

"[In blaming everything on Stalin] the true problems are evaded, which are why and how Soviet society could and did reach certain forms alien to the democratic way and to the legality which it had set for itself even to the point of degeneration." (Palmiro Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"Why did these things happen? Were they inevitable? Are they inherent in socialism, in Communist philosophy?" (Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)

2. Questioning Soviet Sincerity in the De-Stalinization Campaign

"It is stated, that things have changed, but the truth is that the only thing that has changed is the men in the Kremlin... The truth of yesterday is not the truth of today. In this way many truths become doubtful and the responsibilities become collective." (Umberto Terracini, as reported in New York Times, 30 March)

"If there was so much self-serving intention substituted for fact all along, not, as far as we know, opposed by the present leaders, how do we know that they are telling the truth now?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 29 March)

"Why are we asked to take Khrushchev's word for all this? Where is the proof? They are saying that Lenin left a will in which he warned against Stalin. Trotsky also said the same. So Khrushchev and Trotsky agree? Is Trotsky, too, about to be vindicated? Is the great Andrei Vishinsky who conducted the trials of the Trotskyites another stinker? Was it all just a notion of Stalin's? How is the 'cult of the individual' built up without the consent of the other members of the Central Committee? Why has the discussion of the Stalin question suddenly ceased in the Worker?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 13 May)

3. Criticisms of the Soviet Leadership for the Handling of the Khrushchev Report on Stalin

"We do not hesitate to state that we don't like the way Khrushchev's speech was made public. The leaders of the Soviet Union probably had their reasons for letting the contents come out piece-meal and in round-about way. In our opinion they made a mistake and should have published the speech immediately and made it available throughout the world." (Editorial, New York Daily Worker, 6 June)

"...The Politburo regrets that because of the conditions under which Comrade Khrushchev's report was presented and divulged, the bourgeois press was in a position to publish facts of which the French Communists had been unaware. Such a situation is not favorable to normal discussion of these problems within the Party. It facilitates, on the contrary, speculation and maneuvers on the part of the enemies of Communism." (Statement of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party, L'Humanite, 19 June)

"At the private session of the 24th National Congress of our Party on April 1, a resolution was passed and conveyed to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, regretting that a public statement on this question had not been made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which could have enabled the members of all Communist Parties and the staunch friends of the Soviet Union to have understood fully the seriousness of the issues and helped them to a better understanding of everything that is involved. Our Party has not received any official version of the report of Comrade Khrushchev." (Statement of the Political Committee of the British Communist Party, London Daily Worker, 22 June)

"... The Politburo of the Austrian Communist Party's Central Committee sometime ago requested the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to place this document at the disposal of our Party. We Austrian Communists voiced the belief that questions of such big international importance must be treated in a manner which takes into account the conditions under which the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries are waging their struggles." (Volksstimme, 26 June)

"I do not know whether this re-examination will include the problem, which has been raised in a number of cell and section discussions, of the manner in which our Party was informed of these criticisms, and in particular of the report made by Comrade Khrushchev. We recognize that the method was bad, but on the other hand we ask you to recognize that our responsibility is not involved in any way. For obvious reasons of courtesy towards our Soviet Comrades, we could not have acted otherwise than as we did. A certain amount of critical dissatisfaction also has been expressed in our Party concerning aspects and concerning the form of the report." (Palmiro Togliatti, Report to the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, 24 June, L'Unita, 26 June)

4. Togliatti Raises the Question of One-Party Rule in the USSR

While attempting to defend the Soviet system of one-party rule, Togliatti definitely advanced the question of the one-party system as a source of the Stalinist evils.

"We are reminded, first of all, that Lenin, in his last speeches and writings, stressed the danger of bureaucracy which threatened the new society. It seems to us that undoubtedly Stalin's errors were tied in with an excessive increase in the bureaucratic

apparatus in Soviet economic and political life, and perhaps, above all, in Party life. And here it is extremely difficult to distinguish between cause and effect. The one gradually became the expression of the other ...

.....
"Following the early period during which Stalin performed services for the Soviet state the sound forces of the Party rallied and united around him. Now it can be observed that these forces rallied around Stalin and, guided by him, accepted such modifications in the function of the Party and of its directing organisms, i.e., the new functioning of the apparatus controlled from above, as the result of which either they could not offer opposition when the evils began to appear, or else at the outset they did not fully understand that they were evils.

"Perhaps we are not in error in asserting that the damaging restrictions placed on the democratic regime, and the gradual emergence of bureaucratic organizational forms stemmed from the Party...

"In the exaltation of ... achievements there prevailed, particularly in the then current propaganda but also in the general political line, a tendency to exaggerate, to consider all problems already solved and objective contradictions, difficulties, and differences, which are always inherent in the development of a society, as having been overcome... In this period one had the feeling in the Soviet Union that the leaders, even if they were aware of the conditions, failed to present correctly these problems to the Party and the people.

.....
"Stalin was at the same time the expression and the maker of a situation, because he had shown himself the most expert organizer and leader of a bureaucratic-type apparatus at the time when this got the better of the democratic forms of life, as well as because he provided a doctrinal justification of what was in reality an erroneous line and on which later was based his personal power, to the point of taking on degenerate forms." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

5. British and American Communist Questioning of Democratic Centralism as a Source of Stalinism

"From what is asserted to have happened in the CPSU it would seem that democracy has been absent for 20 years or so. How was it possible for such a state of affairs to arise in such a Party? Is it that the Party system of 'Democratic Centralism' is at fault? Does it carry the danger of too much centralism? Is Democratic Centralism useful and necessary only for certain stages and conditions?" (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 29 March)

"Was the brutal suppression of civil liberties in the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, etc., an abuse of democratic centralism, or was this suppression an inevitable outgrowth of democratic centralism--a system of party organization born in the bitter illegality of Tsarism and hardened under the martial law conditions of civil war and intervention?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 28 May)

6. Stalin's Manipulation of Doctrine

"... Stalin ... usurped not only the power belonging to the people and the part to be played by the Party, but also the position of final authority in all fields..." (Cyrankiewicz Speech, Warsaw Broadcast, 27 March)

"... The theory of the sharpening of the class struggle was invented by Stalin ... Stalin's morbid suspiciousness and his growing despotism, allowing not even the least objection, found expression in this theory. With the aid of this theory he wanted to justify the application of drastic measures of repression not only with regard to enemies and political adversaries, but also with regard to persons representing different views." (Jerzy Morawski, Trybuna Ludu, 27 March)

"... The theory of 'class struggle under Socialism'... seems to be a major question about which new thought is needed.

"At the time of the struggle to 'liquidate the Kulaks,' Stalin laid it down that in the period of working class power the class struggle would keep on intensifying and, in particular, that the weaker the capitalist forces became and the stronger socialism became the more would the struggle intensify..."

"He was evidently right in saying that the class struggle had to be stepped up in the USSR at that particular time /i.e., 1928/. But was what he said true as a universal principle? Evidently not ..." (Maurice Cornforth, London Daily Worker, 23 March. Cornforth is a leading British Communist theoretician.)

"Stalin gave a pseudo-scientific formulation to this fearful confusion /i.e., connected with the "capitalist encirclement" and the internal "class enemy"/ through his erroneous thesis of the inherent increase in enemies and in the sharpening of the class struggle with the progress of building socialism. This made permanent and aggravated the confusion itself and was the origin of unheard-of violations of Socialist legality which have been denounced publicly today." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

7. Criticisms of Soviet Evasions and Deceptions

a. Suppression of the Khrushchev Speech on Stalin*

"I think it is extremely important to the whole world Socialist movement that the CPSU publish to the world its detailed report on the cult of the individual and state specifically what crimes were committed. It is not we who interfere by demanding details, but the Soviet Communist Party ... Let them give us the whole dose at once, or else let them give an official and convincing explanation of why they are holding back." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 17 May)

b. Suppression of Lenin's "Testament"

"The first part of the /Khrushchev/ report is devoted to the re-evocation of an old polemic--of the antagonism, so to speak, between Lenin and Stalin: an antagonism well known in all its details outside the USSR, but which the official historians of the Soviet Union had passed over for 30 years, as if the testament of Lenin had not even existed." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

c. Refutation of Khrushchev's Line that Opposition to Stalin was Impossible Because of His Control of the Organs of Coercion

"... I rule out the explanation that a change was impossible solely because of the presence of a military

* See also paragraph 3 above.

police, terror apparatus which controlled the situation with its means. The same apparatus consisted of, and was led by, men who in a serious moment of stress, for example such as Hitler's attack, would have likewise been subject to elemental reactions if a crisis had developed. To me it seems much better to recognize that Stalin, in spite of the errors which he was committing, continued to command the solidarity of the overwhelming majority of the nation, and above all had the support of his leading cadres and also of the masses." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

d. Soviet Tampering with the "Bad" Period of Stalin's Rule

"... It is still not clear, to us, if the current denunciations of the violation of legality and application of the illegitimate and morally repugnant prosecuting methods extend to the entire period of the trials, or only to a given period /from 1935 on/..." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

e. Soviet Evasions and Deceptions Concerning Stalin's Anti-Semitic Policies

"We are deeply disturbed by facts revealed in information coming from Poland that organs and media of Jewish culture were summarily dissolved and a number of their leaders executed. This is contrary to the Soviet Union's historic contributions to the Jewish question. Khrushchev's failures to deal with these outrages, and the continuing silence of Soviet leaders, requires an explanation." (Statement of CPUSA, New York Daily Worker, 25 June)

"We also express our concern that in the long list of crimes mentioned in the /Khrushchev/ speech, there was silence on those committed against Jewish culture and Jewish cultural leaders. We do not consider the speech to be the last word on just how Stalin's terror control came into existence and maintained itself for 20 years and of the role of the other Communist leaders." (Editorial, New York Daily Worker, 6 June)

"If, as she says /Mrs. Furtseva, alternate member of the Presidium/CPSU/, Jewish culture has been developing freely, where are the Yiddish books, the Yiddish theatre, the Yiddish schools?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 27 June)

"When Pravda reprinted the Dennis article it left out the attack on 'snuffing out the lives of more than a score of Jewish cultural figures.' If the charge was untrue, all Pravda had to do was to deny it. Moreover, an explanation is long overdue from the Soviet leaders about the physical annihilation of the top Soviet Jewish writers and poets in the late 40s." (Joseph Clark column, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)

f. Continued Soviet Evasions and Deceptions

"There is a ready tendency to slide over the many and varied problems presented by the current revaluations by burying thought with fresh armfuls of cliches and hackneyed phrases. Alongside such stalwarts as 'developing crisis' and 'Wall Street imperialists' we now have: 'cult of the individual' and 'Beria gang,' all of which gets as meaningful as soap commercials when used as a substitute for thought." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 24 April)

"... Mr. Khrushchev led men of good will to understand that the document itself would be a warning of the monstrous dangers inherent in secret and dictatorial government. I, for one, looked hopefully but vainly at the end of the document for a pledge that the last execution had taken place on Soviet soil. I looked for a pledge of civil rights, for the sacred right of habeas corpus, of public appeal to higher courts, of final judgment by one's peers rather than by professional judges.

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"Instead, I learned that three more executions had been announced from the Soviet Union, and my stomach turned over with the blood-letting, with the madness of vengeance and countervengeance, of suspicion and countersuspicion.. I don't think I am alone in this feeling. I think millions of human beings share my disgust at this idiotic behavior--wicked, uncivilized, but above all, idiotic." (Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker, 12 June)

II. Foreign Communist Reflections on Stalin's Rule as a Source of Degeneration

"The least arbitrary of the generalizations is the one which sees in Stalin's errors a progressive encroachment by personal power on the collective entities of a democratic origin and nature and, as a result of this, the pile-up of phenomena of bureaucracy, of violation of legality, of stagnation and, also, partially, of degeneration of different points of the social organism." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"It was evident from that time on /i.e., from the time of the purges of 1936-1938/ that Soviet public life had undergone in the previous ten years a double process of degeneration: on the one hand, of the Party and state machine toward forms of bureaucratization and terrorism, and on the other hand, of the internal opposition toward forms of conspiracy and palace revolution." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"The distortions arising from the cult of the individual, from the infringement of the Leninist norms of Party life, went deep into life. They went deep into the life of our country as well. Stubborn, petrified bureaucracy, suppression of criticism, disregard for the needs and views of the people--these are only some of the evils which could become rampant in the atmosphere of the cult of the individual and of the infringement of the principles of Party democracy. It is only too often that we can still meet the harmful consequences of this atmosphere--commandeering, intimidation, disregard for collective will. In this atmosphere servility and obsequiousness developed, as well as an automatic attitude of obedience to all 'orders from above,' an attitude of concealing truth, lack of independent thinking and initiative." (Jerzy Morawski, Trybuna Ludu, 27 March)

III. Questioning and Criticism of Soviet "Democracy"

"... It seems irrefutable to us, at any rate, that the bureaucratization of the Party, of the state organisms, of the labor unions, and, above all, of the peripheral organisms which are the most important, must have checked and compressed the democratic functioning of the state and the creative drive of the entire society with real, evident damage resulting therefrom.

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"... What must be studied thoroughly and clarified are the problems pertaining to the interrelation of political democracy and economic democracy, of internal democracy and the leadership function of the party with the democratic operation of the state, and how a mistake made in one of these fields may have repercussions on the entire system." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"... The collective direction of the Politburo or of the Central Committee would certainly be preferable to the direction of one man, but if in the collective direction of the Politburo or of the Central Committee there is progress compared to personal direction, enlightened or tyrannical as it may be, there is nevertheless no guarantee of democratic life. Now the whole problem of Soviet society, the whole problem of the People's Democracies which have followed in the footsteps of Soviet society, is reduced to the necessity for internal democratization, for the circulation of ideas; in a word, for political liberty, a necessity which has lain beneath the surface of Soviet society for many years. It is substantially a question of eliminating in the state, in the laws, and above all in customs all the surviving incrustations of War Communism, of creating means and instruments for the formation of the free political initiative of the citizen, without there hanging over his head the accusation of being an enemy of the people, a deviationist, a saboteur every time he tries to give weight, in dealings with public authority, to his own personal and independent evaluation of the path to be followed.

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"After a century has passed, the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat must be thought out again and reconsidered in relation to a society where the influence and weight of the proletariat and of the workers in general have become a determinant in public life and where, in countries democratically and socially more advanced, the state reflects the continuous evolution of class positions." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"In my opinion, the Soviet leadership is wrong in claiming their government is a full-fledged socialist state; socialism without democracy is simply not socialism ... The Marxist leadership failed completely--never seemed really interested--in imbuing the country, not to speak of themselves, with an understanding of and respect for civil rights and what is known generally as the Rights of Man." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 31 May)

IV. Co-Responsibility of Other Soviet Leaders for Stalin's Tyranny

1. For Permitting Stalin to Seize Total Power

"If, after the collective leadership left by Lenin, Stalin acquired so much power in his own hands, then all in the leadership who acquiesced in such concentration of power are fully responsible for what followed. If after the concentration of power in Stalin's hands those in the leadership with him supported his now criticized policies knowing they were wrong they are despicable scoundrels who should not be entrusted with the responsibility of fanning a breeze in a hot room. ...The Khrushchev report ... reminds me of nothing so much as a man sitting in judgment on himself." (Letter to the Editor, New York Daily Worker, 14 June)

"These critics /who asked why the present leaders did not take action against Stalin during his lifetime/ would have been on stronger ground had they asked why the Central Committee chose Stalin as general secretary in spite of Lenin's warning." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 17 July)

"Who guided the Bolsheviks in view of the fact that their Congresses, their Central Committee, their Politburo, the Soviets, little by little, had allowed themselves to be stripped of their prerogatives of control and their right of initiative over 20 years? ... We do not even know how the Soviet ruling group has arrived at its conclusions, whether it is in agreement or divided, and if so on what, and why." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"Where were the present leaders during the period when they say that collective leadership was lacking? What about their own mistakes in that period of capitalist encirclement?" (Alan Max column, New York Daily Worker, 13 March)

"But why did Stalin succeed in getting rid with comparative ease of all his adversaries, in making leading party organs powerless and in substituting himself for justice, Government, the Supreme Court and even the local Soviets? Why did not the party, the Soviets and the proletariat resist before Stalin triumphed and why were those who did isolated and defeated?" (Nenni, Avanti, 3 July) (Following the issuance of the 30 June Central Committee Resolution.)

2. For Contributing to Stalin's Monopoly of Power

"And the mistake of his Stalin's collaborators was in not seeing this in time, in having allowed him to go on thus until correction was no longer possible without damage to all concerned. As can well be imagined, to this can be joined the question of co-responsibility for these mistakes of the entire political leadership group, including the comrades who today have provided the impetus both for the correction of the evil which had been done and its after effects. The present Soviet leaders knew Stalin much better than we and therefore we must believe them today when they describe him in this manner. We can only think, among ourselves, that since this was the case, aside from the already discussed possibility of a timely change, at least they could have been more cautious in their public and solemn praise of this man's qualities to which we were conditioned. True, today, they offer criticism and this is to be lauded, but with such criticism they lose without doubt a little of their own prestige." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"The Communist Party is the guardian of the rights of the working people. How did it happen that this guardianship failed to be exercised and the crimes stopped long before the death of Stalin? Clearly, responsibility for this failure falls on the shoulders of the leadership of the CPSU as a whole. They endorsed Stalin's wrong theory that the class struggle must be intensified after socialism was built." (Statement adopted by the National Committee of the Canadian Labor-Progressive Party, i.e., CP Canada, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)

"Those leaders who today rise like great new giants and hurl denunciatory rocks at the body of the dead Stalin must have been very willing to let that same Stalin make the decisions then. They did not dare assume the responsibility in those fateful critical days. Otherwise Stalin could not have attained such frightful, overwhelming personal power. But they were the eager and willing water, as it were, that, inevitably, made the Stalin plant grow." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 29 March)

3. For Acquiescing to Stalin's Murders

"If one considers that the power of Stalin was not at that time what it became later, with the war, it is evident that the massacres disclosed by Khrushchev involve responsibilities which were not Stalin's alone

but those of the whole directing apparatus. Terror, in conditions of time and place not justified by necessity, was the price paid for the suppression of all democratic life inside the party and the state. . .

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". . . At last, the final sally, which was intended to be a justification for K. and the other members of the Politburo: 'Stalin obviously had a plan to eliminate the old members of the Politburo.' At this point K. answers the questions that must have been in the air: 'Where were the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee? Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And why is this being done only now?' The answer is: 'The members of the Politburo saw these problems in a different way at different times.'

"This answer may be valid in a strictly personal sense, but it is not valid for the Politburo. There is no doubt that the facts cited by Khrushchev, and on which world opinion now awaits proper documentation, must have placed the members of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. But they had been placed in posts of responsibility precisely for this purpose, precisely to face difficult situations." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"Where was Khrushchev when all those 'crimes' were being committed?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 1 April)

"Is it not obvious that to repeat 'the Beria gang' was responsible for the executions is merely to circumvent one of the central points in the discussion. . .? That question is: where were the rest of the Soviet leadership? Could they have permitted the execution of such outstanding Soviet citizens without being involved in discussion or the decision? It is certainly not possible, since these executions were part of a major ideological campaign against cosmopolitanism." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 26 April)

"How fearless were Khrushchev and the others when many of the best Communists in the Soviet Union were being murdered? Or were they part of the terror apparatus? Did they have a secret trial and murder of Beria because they needed a scapegoat, and because a public trial would have implicated them as part of the terror? Was Beria an 'imperialist agent' or was that a phony trial too? Why must Dennis gloss over the fact, recognized by millions

of people, that Khrushchev, speaking for the present Soviet leadership, at no time had one word of self-criticism for himself personally or for the group?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)

"If Beria and his gang were responsible for the break with Yugoslavia why was he not brought to open trial? If the executions in Hungary were frameups is it correct to put all the blame on a police chief rather than the Party leadership?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 11 April)

4. The Question of Opposition to Stalin

"... What alternative policies to Stalin's were suggested by others and rejected? What resistance was made in top official circles to Stalin's trend toward super-centralization and denial of collective leadership?" (William Z. Foster column, New York Daily Worker, 16 March)

"It has also not yet been made clear as to whether or not or to what degree, the Party and its leaders were able, at least partially, to check the undemocratic course of Stalin and to hold the USSR on the fundamentally correct political line which it followed over the years." (William Z. Foster column, New York Daily Worker, 4 April)

"In the discussion on the XXth Congress currently being centered around the special Khrushchev report, questions frequently arise about the present Soviet leadership. Did some of them try to bring about changes before the last three years? Could the past evils have been checked earlier? How big and serious are the changes now under way?" (Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)

5. Failure of Soviet Leaders to Admit their own Mistakes

"It is inconceivable that after such major mistakes were revealed, that there is not a resolution or a speech at the Congress, nor even a whiff of self-criticism by the leadership of its own errors. I think we ought to tell the Soviet comrades that it was these mistaken and wrong policies which led to the crimes." (Steve Nelson article, New York Daily Worker, 24 June)

"If a leading Marxist in the Soviet Union could give that type of personalized report [i.e., Khrushchev's secret report on Stalin] and have it acceptable to the leading

Marxists of a Socialist nation, I suggest that they are not through with their errors and that perhaps others may have to do the job of explaining and analyzing what they have left undone." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 14 June)

V. The Question of Credit for Soviet Achievements

"... as long as we confine ourselves, in substance, to denouncing the personal faults of Stalin as the cause of everything we remain within the realm of the 'personality cult.' First, all that was good was attributed to his equally exceptional and even astonishing faults. In the one case, as well as in the other, we are outside the criterion of judgment intrinsic in Marxism." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"It was wrong, while Stalin was still living, to shower him with dithyrambic praise and to give him the exclusive credit for all the successes in the Soviet Union which were due to a correct general policy in the construction of Socialism. This attitude contributed to the development of the cult of the individual and negatively influenced the international labor movement. Today, it is wrong to blame Stalin alone for every negative act of the CPSU." (Statement of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party, L'Humanité, 19 June)

VI. The Question of Guarantees Against Recurrence of Stalinism

"... One general problem, common to the entire movement, has arisen from the criticisms of Stalin--the problem of the perils of bureaucratic degeneration, of stifling democratic life, of the confusion between the constructive revolutionary force and the destruction of revolutionary legality, of separation of the economic and political leadership from the life, criticism, and creative activity of the masses. We shall welcome a contest among the Communist parties in power to find the best way to avoid this peril once and for all. It will be up to us to work out our own method and life in order that we, too, may be protected against the evils of stagnation and bureaucratization, in order that we may learn to solve together the problems of freedom for the working masses and of social

justice, and hence gain for ourselves ever increasing prestige and membership among the masses." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

With respect to the pledges at the end of the secret Khrushchev report on Stalin (rooting out the cult, restoring Leninist principles, etc.) Pietro Nenni observes:

"Fine declarations which, when Stalin was alive, were made a hundred times by Stalin and other Soviet leaders." (Avanti, 24 June).

"... Mr. Khrushchev led men of good will to understand that the document itself would be a warning of the monstrous dangers inherent in secret and dictatorial government. I, for one, looked hopefully but vainly at the end of the document for a pledge that the last execution had taken place on Soviet soil. I looked for a pledge of civil rights, for the sacred right of habeas corpus, of public appeal to higher courts, of final judgment by one's peers rather than by professional judges." (Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker, 12 June)

"Was Mr. Khrushchev's secret report meant to be secret? Was it delivered in good faith? Things are changing tremendously for the best in the Soviet Union, without doubt, but why then still employ capital punishment? Collective leadership exists in the Soviet Union, but why is so much being done, written and published in the name of Khrushchev? Why not permit recently freed leaders to lead in the new formation of Soviet government and Party?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 28 June)

VII. Foreign Communist Subservience To Moscow

1. British and American Communists Admit Uncritical Adherence to Moscow Line

"Where I failed miserably and where I swear by all that is holy that I will not fail again, was in not exercising the same judgment toward the Soviet Union. This would not have lessened my belief in socialism; it would have increased it, and it would have increased and strengthened the belief of others as well. For I saw only a land that had won socialism, and I failed to see that to win socialism and to abandon the holy right of man to his own conscience, his own dignity, his right to say what he pleases when he pleases, to speak

clearly and boldly for the truth as he sees the truth--and fearing no man, whether right or wrong--is no victory at all.

"It is some small comfort to say that I did not know the facts in the Khrushchev report; but I cannot rest on that. I knew that the death penalty existed in the Soviet Union, and I knew in my own heart that capital punishment is an abomination and a disgrace to mankind. I knew there were prisons, and I believed that civilized society would make a short shift of prisons, and yet I failed to charge the Soviet Union with this. I accepted the fact that Jewish culture had been wiped out in Russia; and I know that this is a fate no culture should ever meet; yet this too I did not challenge. I knew that Jews were forbidden to leave Russia for Israel, and yet I did not raise my voice to protest this restriction, even though I could make no sense or reason out of it. I knew that writers and artists and scientists were intimidated, but I accepted this as a necessity of socialism, even as I accepted all else that I have enumerated as a necessity of socialism." (Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker, 12 June)

"How was it possible for so many Communists in the 'West,' and so many non-Communist statesmen and political leaders to accept the idea that treason and treachery had assumed such fantastic proportions in the Soviet Union as were claimed in the series of purges and trials that took place in the 1930's and subsequently?" (Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)

"Making due allowance for the distortions and caricatures of Soviet policy that appear in the capitalist press, why did the Daily Worker editors feel called upon to go along with each successive position [of the USSR] without ever having the humility to admit that they may have been wrong in their previous position?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 22 March)

"... If Marxists in the U.S. come to disagree over a particular issue with Marxists in the Soviet Union, it is we who are in error and must give way. The Soviet position, as if by definition, is 'the Marxist' position. What kind of critical thinking is that? ... I would rather be right, than Marxist!" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 3 May)

"If the Soviet-Yugoslav friction was occasioned at least in part by the unwarranted attempt of one Communist Party to dominate another, on whom did the obligation of objective

criticism rest more squarely than on a party detached by distance and immediate interest from the smoke of that battle /i.e., the CPUSA/?" (Letter from Ring Lardner Jr., New York Daily Worker, 18 March)

/Relative to the Statement of the Executive Committee of the CP Great Britain:/ "The statement pleads 'false information' and 'good faith' as an excuse for our own uncritical and inaccurate propaganda about the Soviet Union, extending over a period of 20 years. Surely 'good faith' is not sufficient in the leadership of a party of scientific Socialism? This is not self-criticism, it is self-justification. The statement emphasizes that all abuses in the Soviet Union took place against the background of 'total human advance.' Can one consider a period which opened with the suicide of Mayakovsky and ended with the suicide of Fadayev, which saw the murder of Gorky and the silencing in various ways of many Jewish writers (and perhaps others)--can this period be considered to be one of total human advance?" (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 4 June)

"Did we really have to wait for Mikoyan to tell us that for '20 years the cult of personality flourished' before we were aware of it or before we could admit it? Our attitude in the past has indescribably been one which can best be described as 'uncritical acceptance.' What the Soviet Union did, we endorsed. Future prospects are inspiring but let us not assume that because the Soviet Union has done something it must be good." (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 6 March)

"But do we learn? For many years people, both Communists and non-Communists, have had doubts about what is now termed 'the cult of the individual.' As Marxists should we accept everything that happens in the Soviet Union uncritically as the best of all possible worlds?" (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 6 March)

"This sudden rush of criticism amazes me--where was it all hidden before? All the 'discussions' I've attended in the last 15 years and never a dissenting voice did I hear--why?" (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 29 March)

"But support for the general political line of the CPSU does not mean the abandonment of our own right to criticize and of our own need to work out policy on the basis of the need of interests and experiences of the British people. In the last few years work in various

fields of culture has been dominated by Soviet discussions which were not necessarily relevant to our own needs. . . . I am not concerned with the correcting of Stalin's formulations. . . . I suggest that the Communist Party cultural work is badly in need of overhauling, on the basis of freest discussion." (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 12 March)

2. Togliatti Charges that the CPSU Excluded Criticism.

"Later, our parties spoke less and less of the questions which our Soviet comrades faced in the building of a socialist society because, among other things, our Soviet comrades did not present them to us any longer as problems, as they had before, but almost as stages of a progress already well under way, the course of which did not give rise to any new serious themes." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

3. Togliatti Proposes "Polycentrism"

"I do not believe it will be possible for all this to lead to a diminution of the mutual trust and solidarity among the various parties of the Communist movement. However, undoubtedly, not only the need but also the desire for increasingly greater autonomy in judgments will come out of this; and this cannot help but benefit our movement. The internal political structure of the world Communist movement has changed today. What the CPSU has done remains, as I said, as the first great model of building a socialist society for which the way was opened by a deep, decisive revolutionary breach. Today, the front of socialist construction in countries where the Communists are the leading party has been so broadened (amounting to a third of the human race) that even for this part the Soviet model cannot and must not any longer be obligatory. In every country governed by the Communists, the objective and subjective conditions, traditions, the organizational forms of the movement can and must assert their influence in different ways. In the rest of the world there are countries where we wish to start socialism although the Communists are not the leading party. In still other countries, the march toward socialism is an objective for which there is a concentration of efforts coming from various movements, which, however, have not yet reached either an agreement or a reciprocal understanding. The whole system becomes polycentric, and even in the Communist movement itself we cannot speak of a single guide but rather of progress which is achieved by following paths which are often different." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

" . . . There is established what I called in the interview . . . a polycentric system, corresponding to the new situation, to the alteration in the world make-up and in the very structure of the workers' movements, and to this system correspond also new types of relations among the Communist parties themselves. The solution which today probably most nearly corresponds to this new situation, may be that of the full autonomy of the individual Communist parties and of bilateral relations between them to establish complete, mutual understanding and complete, mutual trust, conditions necessary for collaboration and to give unity to the Communist movement itself and to the entire progressive movement of the working class." (Togliatti, Report to the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, 24 June, L'Unita, 26 June)

4. Reaction to the 30 June Central Committee Resolution

a. Togliatti

"I have not yet read the full text of the CPSU Central Committee final resolution on the origin and consequences of the personality cult. Judging by what I know of the resolution, it seems to me that that document provides a contribution of extreme importance for the clarification of the questions aroused among the international workers and Communist world by the criticism of Stalin's work made by the XXth CPSU Congress.

"As for my attitude at my well-known interview, perhaps the best thing to do now is to read carefully what I have written. In my opinion, and I have said so openly, the line followed by the Soviet comrades in the construction of a Communist society was undoubtedly right; but within the general framework of this acknowledgement, there may be differing opinions on the value and importance of the errors committed under Stalin's leadership, the violations of legality, the restrictions on democracy, and so on, over the economic and political development of the Soviet Union.

"I repeat that such differing opinions are possible and a frank discussion on the matter cannot but prove useful for the development of our movement, because it corresponds to a higher degree of maturity and of mutual understanding and confidence.

"This is all the more true since such differences of opinion do not diminish, but, in fact, as far as myself and the leading organs of the Italian Communist Party are concerned, perhaps they enhance our unreserved approval of action taken by the CPSU leaders to overcome completely the consequences to which the cult of Stalin's person has led in the USSR and in the international workers' movement." (Paese Sera, 3 July)

b. Nenni

"The document of the Central Committee of the CPSU on overcoming the cult of the individual and its consequences, explains several things in the famous secret report of Khrushchev which up to now remained obscure or unknown. It illustrates with the greatest Marxist coherence the causes of the formation of the cult and of the personal dictatorship of Stalin, but it still does not answer the fundamental questions which the Khrushchev report has raised so dramatically with its revelations of the illegalities and the atrocities of Stalin.

"The summary that we have of the resolution of the Central Committee confirms, for example, with the greatest clarity the secret report of how Stalin's personal dictatorship evolved, how difficult it was to combat Stalin during the last twenty years, because his guilt was unknown to almost all of the Soviet people while all the successes of the USSR were attributed to his personal merit.

"We know better why the abnormal situation of the last twenty years developed. Thus we know that certain circumstances contributed to the personal dictatorship of Stalin, among which, as the document of the Central Committee states, was the capitalist encirclement of the USSR, which Stalin used to justify a temporary restriction of democracy which he later rendered permanent. From the resolution of the Central Committee emerges the principle of the necessity of "War Communism" which Stalin exploited for his dictatorial ends.

"But all this is still not sufficient. The phases of passing from the dictatorship of the proletariat to that of the Party, and from the latter to that of Stalin, are not described in the document; nor is there any treatment of how and why Stalin succeeded in carrying out his plans. The practical impossibility of overthrowing Stalin or seriously resisting him after

he had gained control of the Party, his seizure of absolute power, the substituting of himself for the Party and for the constitutional organs of the state, which the Khrushchev report describes, is comprehensible. But why was Stalin able to succeed in ridding himself with relative ease of all his adversaries, in depriving the directing organs of the Party of authority, in substituting himself for justice and government from local soviets all the way up to the Supreme Soviet? Why did the Party, the soviets, the proletariat not resist before Stalin triumphed, and why were those who did resist isolated and defeated?

"The document of the Central Committee does not answer all this; it does not explain why Stalin's power was such that he could exploit a fundamental error which prevailed in the Bolshevik Party after the death of Lenin. Having suppressed the other parties--and thereby democracy based on the plurality of parties--democracy within the party was also suppressed. Having eliminated the other parties, from the Mensheviks to the Socialist Revolutionaries, from competition with the Bolshevik Party, having eliminated the internal factions of the Bolshevik Party, utilizing the rivalry of his followers and oftentimes that of his adversaries whom he succeeded in pitting one against the other, it was easy for Stalin, who in the course of this operation had accumulated immense personal power, also to eliminate democracy from within his own faction, remaining the only legal force in the Party and in the state." (Unsigned editorial, Avanti, 3 July)

c. CPUSA

"In the latest chapter in this discussion, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has now given its reply to some of these questions. Many Marxists will feel satisfied with the answers which the Soviet Communist Party now presents. Many will feel that the final answers still need to be found and that the discussion must continue.

"The Daily Worker will have more to say on the Soviet Communist Party's statement in the future and we will keep our readers informed, as the discussion goes on, of the views of Marxists here and throughout the world.

"A deeper probing of the errors in the Soviet Union can only result in speeding the profound changes already getting under way in that country. It can be of

invaluable help to the Communist movements elsewhere, and to the cause of co-existence and world peace." (Editorial, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)

"The Soviet Communist Party's resolution is a most welcome development in the friendly interchange of opinion among Marxists of the world. It correctly turns attention to the profound significance of its XXth Congress, with its historic decisions paving the way for new socialist advances and its far-reaching conclusions on the non-inevitability of war and the possibility for peaceful paths of Socialism in democratic countries.

"The resolution correctly estimates the sinister aims of those reactionary circles who would bury the tremendous achievements of the XXth Congress under an avalanche of speculation about the re-evaluation of Stalin. It coincides with our estimate that reactionary circles here and elsewhere are trying to distort and utilize Khrushchev's special report on Stalin to disrupt the solidarity of the international working class movement.

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"In my opinion the resolution of the CPSU goes a long way in explaining--while clearly not justifying--what has become known as the growth of the cult of the individual and the unforgivable violations of socialist legality and principles that took place in the latter period of Stalin's leadership. The substance of this matter will be discussed shortly by our National Committee which will then collectively express its views." (Statement by Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 4 July)

"It is this attempt to exploit the present discussion in order to attack the fundamentals of socialism and to glorify monopoly capitalism, which the Soviet resolution of the Soviet Communist Party warns against. This warning needs to be heeded by everyone participating in the discussion. However, in my opinion, it would be unfortunate if this warning were interpreted as meaning that the only safe way to discuss is to have no discussion at all. I am afraid that the wording and tone of the Soviet Communist Party resolution opens it up to the interpretation. I say this in spite of the fact that the Central Committee statement, in my opinion, marks an advance in the discussion in that it presents a historical background to the 'cult of the individual.'

"The fact is, however, that the profound questions raised by Palmiro Togliatti and others with regard to the limitations of socialist democracy in the USSR, have no relation to such anti-socialist sentiments as expressed by the New York Times and it does not help the discussion to suggest they do. In my judgment the Soviet statement does not fully answer the questions raised by Togliatti. Nor does it dispose of the matter by quoting from various Communist sources as if in opposition to Togliatti." (Alan Max, New York Daily Worker, 9 July)

"The resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a most valuable and important contribution to analyzing the origins, effects and lessons of the mistakes made by the CPSU under Stalin's leadership. We welcome it.

"In responding to the discussion and views of other Marxist parties of the world, including our own, the resolution reflects the developing relationship of independent and friendly criticism which today marks the fraternal solidarity of Communist parties.

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"The resolution of the CPSU is a timely and major contribution to a further strengthening of such international solidarity. It assists all Marxist and working class organizations in their struggle to promote peaceful relations among states, irrespective of social systems--the common desire of all mankind.

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"We believe that the resolution of the CPSU provides a convincing answer to the Big Business enemies of Socialism who claim that the gross mistakes made under Stalin's leadership are inherent in Socialism. Not only does the socialist character of the system remain in the Soviet Union, despite the mistakes and injustices under Stalin's leadership, but during the past three years important steps have been taken to correct the mistakes of the past, to further democratize Soviet life and institutions, and to establish guarantees that such harmful injustices will never occur again. We greet these steps and are convinced that the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the CPSU, is moving ahead to a new period of unprecedented Socialist progress.

"In connection with the questions analyzed in the CPSU resolution, we believe certain aspects of the origins and effects of past violations of socialist law and principle need, and will receive, further study and discussion. Among these are: the question of bureaucratic distortions in a Socialist society, as well as the happenings in the sphere of Jewish cultural institutions and their leadership. Our own Party will, in the period ahead, continue to examine these questions with the aim of deepening its understanding of the profound lessons which must be drawn from the disclosures made by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." (Statement of National Committee, 19 July, New York Daily Worker, 26 July)

d. Canada

"The Tribune greets this resolution. It adds greatly to understanding. It puts the whole terrible 'Stalin affair' in better perspective.

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"We believe however, that there remain some still unanswered questions: such as the demand for more light on the excesses against certain nationalities or against Jewish cultural life and the Jewish writers. These are not mentioned. All that is said is that Stalin was 'guilty of many lawless deeds.'

"Nor does it answer the criticism of the way in which the Khrushchev report on Stalin was handled. The Tribune has declared it should have been made available to the press as soon as it was delivered and not allowed to 'leak' out through the U.S. State Department.

"While it offers further clarification, it does not acknowledge that the present leaders of the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted the erroneous theory originated by Stalin, from which so many crimes ensued, that the class struggle must be intensified following the victory of socialism. The 'theory' is attributed solely to Stalin and not the Central Committee or the party Congress that also accepted it.

"On balance, however, we find it a forthright declaration which we believe will do much to clear the air, help to end confusion, restore confidence and bring about the ideological unity of Marxist parties everywhere so necessary for the advance of the peoples to peace, to

national liberation, and each in their own way to socialism." (Editorial from the Canadian Tribune, reprinted in New York Daily Worker, 13 July)

e. France

"The Central Committee warmly approves the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU which shows how the cult of Stalin's person was overcome in the USSR." (Statement of the Central Committee, French Communist Party, L'Humanite, 7 July)

f. Great Britain

"We warmly welcome the resolution of June 30 ..."
(Statement of the Executive Committee of the British Communist Party, 14 July, London Daily Worker, 16 July)

g. Austria

"The resolution ... is welcomed with the greatest satisfaction by the Communist Parties, because it contributes essentially to the clarification of questions in connection with the personality cult." (Johann Koplenig speech to CC/KPOe, Volksstimme, 15 July)

h. West Germany

While adopting a position in accord with that of the 30 June CPSU Resolution, a statement issued by the Secretariat of the KPD included a reference to "symptoms of degeneration" under Stalin, a statement that "the uncovering of the causes which led to the mistakes committed is a task which still has to be solved," and an admission that leading Party cadres had been "fully informed on the entire course of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU." (That is, the KPD leadership had a copy of the secret Khrushchev speech prior to its publication in the press.) (Duesseldorf, Freies Volk, 2 July)